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THE NEW HUNGARIAN BANKING LAW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
BANKING REGULATIONS IN HUNGARY
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 13, 1991, the Hungarian Parliament adopt-
ed a new banking law which came into effect on January 1,
1992.' The new law provides for the establishment and opera-
tion of commercial, investment, and savings banks in Hungary
which are completely separate from the centralized National
Bank of Hungary (NBH).2 One of the many goals stated by
Hungary's Parliament for the new banking law was to encour-
age more foreign investment in the banking industry in order
to further efforts toward a competitive market-based econo-
my.' Furthermore, cognizant of its position as an associate
member of the European Community (EC),4 Hungary specifi-
cally sought to create bank regulations which would enable full
Hungarian EC membership as soon as possible.5
The new law is Hungary's latest in a series of reform ef-
forts which endeavor to liberate Hungary from its remaining
economic and psychological ties to the former Soviet Union.6
For the first time since the end of Soviet dominanance, which
lasted from the 1940s through the 1970s, Hungary's banking
regulations allow non-Hungarians to participate in the banking
industry as full owners of new institutions, or as partial own-
ers of existing Hungarian institutions.' If successful in its
1. 1991. 6vi LX1X t6rv6ny a p~nzintdzetekr81 6s a p~nzint~zeti tev~kenys6gr6l
[Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity], translated in 2 Hungarian
Rules of Law in Force 1779 (1991).
2. Id. art. 5.
3. Id. pmbl.
4. Dr. Gerhard Wegen, Transnational Financial Services-Current Challenges
for an Integrated Europe, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S91, S95 (1992).
5. France: Visegrad Countries Call on EC to Set Timetable, Terms for Mem-
bership, BBC MONITORING SERVICE-E. EUROPE, June 9, 1993, available in
WESTLAW, INT-NEWS-C File [hereinafter Visegrad].
6. IVAN T. BEREND, HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC REFORMS, 1953-1988, at 166-67
(1990).
7. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 15, translated
in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1791.
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efforts to encourage foreign investment in the Hungarian fi-
nancial services sector, Hungary not only hopes to persuade
the EC to accept her as a full member state,8 but she also
hopes to enter the international economy as a solid indepen-
dent trading partner for the first time.
However, the major problem regarding Hungarian mem-
bership in the EC is that the current EC member states9 main-
tain more advanced economic systems, and the EC banking
directives are more liberal toward free trade and nonrestrictive
banking than the regulations Hungary now has." In addition
to the recent stagnation in the Hungarian privatization of
state-owned industry," Hungary will soon face stiff competi-
tion from foreign banks who will be permitted to take advan-
tage of Hungary's new law to begin servicing the Hungarian
financial services sector. 2 Although the new banking law of
1991 was a critical next step in Hungary's effort to modernize
its banking system, the law retains many discriminatory provi-
sions which will discourage foreign investment in the banking
industry when it is needed most.
This Note will compare the new Hungarian banking law's
provisions with the EC's Second Banking Directive to see how
far Hungary has come, and how far it still has to go. Part II
8. Hungarian Banks Prepare to Begin Rough Transition to Western Style, J.
OF COM., June 17, 1991, at 2A, [hereinafter Rough Transition]; Hungary: New
Banking Law Expected to Encourage Foreign Investment, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1855 (Dec. 18, 1991) [hereinafter Hungary's New Banking Law]; see also Richard
Lock et al., Hungary: Bank Privatization, CENT. E. EUR. NEWSL. (Clifford Chance,
London, Eng.), Aug. 1992, at 10. See generally Hungary: Riding the Tiger, THE
BANKER, July 1992, available in LEXIS, BANKNG Library, FINTME File [herein-
after Riding the Tiger].
9. The twelve member states that currently make up the EC are Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Nancy L. Kessler, Banking on Europe: 1992 and
EMU, 60 FORDHAi L. REV. S395, S395 n.1 (1992). The European Free Trade Area
(EFTA) states are not full EC members, but these states have reduced trade barri-
ers between themselves and the EC. The EFTA countries include: Austria, Fin-
land, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. wegen, supra note
4, at S95. The final group of "near EC" members are the so-called "associated
members," including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey. Id. The asso-
ciated members have negotiated agreements regarding trade promotion, national
treatment, and new customs duties among the states in order to gradually work
themselves into the EC. Id.
10. See generally Wegen, supra note 4.
11. Catch a Falling Star, THE BANKER, July 1993, available in LEXIS, BAN-
KNG Library, FINTME File.
12. See generally wegen, supra note 4.
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will discuss the five major periods in Hungarian banking,
viewing each change in the context of the political and sociolog-
ical issues of those periods. Part III will discuss the establish-
ment of the EC, and how EC banking regulations have pro-
gressed during the last forty years toward the harmonized
state of a single market for financial services today. Part IV
compares six specific areas of the new Hungarian banking law
with the same provisions from the EC's Second Banking Direc-
tive. The specific areas are: (1) the establishment of banks; (2)
the country of regulation; (3) the minimum financial standards
for authorization; (4) the foreign treatment of banks abroad; (5)
the ownership limitations; and (6) the authorized banking
activities. Subpart IV.C analyzes the major differences between
the two laws in light of the dual Hungarian goals of encourag-
ing foreign investment in the Hungarian banking industry and
meeting the EC's general membership criteria as quickly as
possible. Part V discusses the observations and implications of
the differences between the two laws and their effects on bank-
ing in Hungary. Finally, Part VI concludes by stating that al-
though the new Hungarian banking law makes great strides
toward encouraging foreign investment in the banking indus-
try, the remaining barriers in the law leave too many
disincentives to investment there. The Note then offers some
suggestions for how Hungary can bring its banking law into
conformity with its stated goals.
II. THE HISTORY OF HUNGARIAN BANKING
The history of Hungarian banking can be separated into
five distinct periods. The banking structure in pre-Soviet Hun-
gary was surprisingly well-advanced, consisting of a competi-
tive market industry which served the entire economy effi-
ciently."3 However, during the second period the Hungarian
banking system was nationalized into the Soviet regime of
government ownership which thereby removed all competitive
forces from the practice of banking, and subjected Hungarians
to the Soviet ideology against their will.'4 During the third
13. See generally Gy6rgy RAnki, The Introduction and Evolution of Planning in
Hungary, in MARKET REFORMS IN SOCIALIST SOCIETIES: COMPARING CHINA AND
HUNGARY 31 (Peter Van Ness ed., 1989).
14. BEREND, supra note 6, at 3.
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period, the disgruntled Hungarians began a comprehensive
reform package called the New Economic Mechanism (NEM),
during which Hungarian banks escaped much structural
change, but suffered further economic setbacks within the
ever-weakening economy while trying to maintain strict inde-
pendence from outside influences.15 During the fourth period,
although the Hungarian reformers hoped that the NEM would
be the radical change necessary to modernize Hungary's econo-
my, the government left the banks unreformed, with only
piecemeal alterations to arm them against the economic hard
times of the 1980s. 6 Finally, during the most recent period,
realizing that minor alterations could not solve the major str-
uctural problems facing Hungarian banks, the government
instituted a major reform in 1987 followed by the new bank-
ing regulations in 1991.18 However, the government still suf-
fers from staunch isolationist tendencies which hold it back
from full international integration.
A. Pre-Soviet Banking in Hungary
The social and political backdrop of the earliest Hungarian
banking period displayed the cultural ideologies which defined
its eventual development. In the 1890s a liberal political party
came to power on a platform of Hungarian nationalism which
spread into every aspect of Hungarian life. This nationalist
sentiment still exists today in the form of systematic discrimi-
nation and severe xenophobia in most Hungarian minds. 9
15. See generally XAVIER RICHET, THE HUNGARIAN MODEL: MARKETS AND
PLANNING IN A SOCIALIST ECONOMY 164 (1989).
16. Id. at vii.
17. FED. RESEARCH Div. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, HUNGARY-A COUNTRY
STUDY 38-39 (Stephen R. Burant ed., 1990) (referring to the Hungarian Banking
Law of 1987); see also DEWEY BALLANTINE THEODORE GODDARD, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
DOING BUSINESS IN HUNGARY 80 (1994).
18. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, translated in .
Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1779.
19. FED. RESEARCH Div. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 38-
39.
For example, in the early 1900s, the Hungarian legislature passed laws
requiring Hungarian to be the official language (while banning others), and the
laws made it a crime to hire a non-Hungarian for a job, regardless of the needs of
the industry or the qualifications of the employee. Id. See generally Jerome M.
Sloan, An Observation of Hungarian Law and Development: Problems and Opportu-
nities 5 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 77 (1991). Toward these nationalistic ends, by
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During this neo-nationalist period, the economy of Hungary
was dominated by several key characteristics. First, and by far
the most important, was that the Hungarian raw materials
base was absolutely lacking; ° therefore, Hungary was totally
dependant on the benefits of international trade for its survival
by importing such necessities as coal, natural gas, and tim-
ber.2' The second key characteristic in the Hungarian econo-
my, which still affects Hungary today, was that most of the
labor force was employed in low-paying jobs and therefore had
no disposable income to buy anything other than basic necessi-
ties.2 The final key characteristic of this period was that the
waning nobility had created a nation-wide credit shortage by
overspending and overborrowing to finance their luxurious
lifestyles,' thus leaving the rest of the country vastly under-
capitalized and unable to modernize their industries to become
more efficient.24
The first Hungarian banks were created during this period
as a symbol of Hungarian separateness from the involvement
of Austrians or other foreign states. Similar to most other
continental European countries, the Hungarian banking sys-
tem during this period was based on the universal banking
model.2" Banks were like large department stores, with each
1918 the Hungarian society was almost completely homogeneous with ninety per-
cent of the population belonging to the Hungarian Catholic church. FED. RESEARCH
DIV. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 38. The other ten percent of
the population consisted of tiny minorities of Germans, Jews, Slovaks, Croats, and
Romanians. During the remaining early 1900s, it was the official policy of the
Hungarian government to set ethnic barriers to strengthen Hungarian nationalism.
Id. at 39. In fact, at the beginning of World War Two, Hungary was allied with
Nazi Germany because the people believed in the ideals of ethnic perfection and
the benefits of a homogeneous society. Id. at 37, 41-43.
20. FED. RESEARCH Div. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 38.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 32-33.
23. The larger and more efficient estates allowed some nobles to purchase
expensive luxury items, while the smaller nobles, feeling the pressure to "keep up
with the Joneses," would borrow money to finance their new acquisitions. Since
the banks were merely arms of the nobility, they were only too happy to help
finance this standard of living. Id. at 24.
24. Id. at 33.
25. See generally id. at 19.
26. Tamds Bdcskai, The Reorganization of the Banking System in Hungary, in
MONEY, INCENTIVES, AND EFFICIENCY IN THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC REFORi 79, 79
(Josef C. Brada & Istvdn Dobozi eds., 1990). The universal banking model is de-
fined as a regulatory system which encourages banking institutions to offer all
1995]
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different banking need serviced by industry experts within one
headquarter building." The few large banks in Hungary were
tightly intertwined with the international banks of other na-
tions, and the rural areas were well served by the local branch-
es, giving full financial services to even the poorest peasants in
Hungary. 8
The modern National Bank of Hungary (NBH) was estab-
lished in 1924 as the successor to the Austro-Hungarian
bank. 9 In addition to a well-managed monetary policy, Hun-
gary had a wealth of highly trained and broadly skilled bank
officers because each bank employee had to be versed in every
aspect of the financial industry. 0 As a rule, the "correctness
and the professionality of banking operations, accounting,
calculation, compilation of balance sheets, correspondence, both
domestic and foreign" was maintained at very high interna-
tional standards. 1 During this period, the Hungarian banking
system was on par with most other industrialized nations,32
and was very much like the well-run market-based competitive
banks in Germany today."
Because Hungary was a "trading nation,"34 there was
much foreign involvement in the banking sector monitoring
both credits extended to importers, and the efficiency of vari-
ous export industries. 5 Despite the seemingly active foreign
presence in Hungarian banks, the Hungarian fear of becoming
dependent on foreign influences caused a governmental policy
which severely restricted foreign bank activities in order to
different types of financial services and products to the clients. Everything from
lending to stock portfolio management and insurance can be serviced at one bank-
ing institution. It is generally believed that the consolidated assets of universal
banks may render them substantially more efficient and customer service oriented.
Wegen, supra note 4, at S107-11.
27. Bdcskai, supra note 26.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 80.
30. Id. at 79.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See generally RAnki, supra note 13; see also infra note 152 and accompa-
nying text discussing the German banking system today which leads the world in
the universal banking system.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21 discussing the lack of raw mate-
rials in Hungary.
35. FED. RESEARCH DIV. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 39-
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preserve Hungarian nationalism."6 Even assuming that this
international discrimination was morally wrong, the Hungari-
an economic policies worked, and as of 1929 the economy was
quite healthy and may have maintained its strength if it were
not for Hungary's dependence on the international trade mar-
kets." As a result of the United States stock market crash
and plummeting prices in the trade markets, the Hungarian
economic framework collapsed as prices and volume of exports
fell, foreign creditors called in Hungarian loans, and economic
disaster struck.8 The worse the economic situation grew, the
more nationalistic and protectionist Hungarians became.39
However, nationalism could not protect Hungary from World
War II, and by the end of the war, the country was devastated
in every area, including its economic and political infrastruc-
ture.
B. The Nationalization of Banking Under the CMEA
In 1945 the victorious Soviet Union succeeded in imposing
its political, social, and economic systems on all of the physi-
cally and economically devastated Eastern European na-
tions,4° including Hungary, to form the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA)."1 However, Hungarians never
fully accepted Soviet domination as being a benefit to their
country, because they were angry at being forced to succumb to
a foreign presence in place of their long fought-for national-
ism." Furthermore, Soviet domination reduced the competi-
tive Hungarian economy to a system of centrally planned gov-
ernment-owned enterprises."
36. Id. at 40-41.
37. Id. at 41.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. RAnki, supra note 13, at 31, 33.
41. SANDOR AUSCH, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CMEA COOPERATION 12 (J.
?Acz & G Hajdu trans., 1972). The members of CMEA until very recently consist-
ed of the following nations: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Id. at 12
n.1.
42. FED. RESEARCH DIV. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 46.
43. The four basic elements of any command economy are: (1) elimination of
the private owner in favor of state-owned property, Rdnki, supra note 13, at 39;
(2) direct orders given in quantity to the managers of each firm telling them who
1995] 679
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In 1948 the Soviet regime announced the forced national-
ization of all industries of production, including banking.44 In
this Soviet system, the NBH became the central authority for
all banking by gaining a monopoly on short-term credit deci-
sions, and it became the direct and almost exclusive source of
any type of credit.45 The pre-existing commercial banks were
all merged into one of three specialized departments within the
NBH.46 The Investment Bank was authorized only to assign
credits for long-term notes from the Planning Board's five-year
schedule; the Foreign Trade Bank dealt exclusively with im-
port and export issues among CMEA nations; and the National
Savings Bank handled the personal deposits of all Hungarian
citizens.47 This total centralization limited any transaction,
among the trading partners they must export that product to, AUSCH, supra note
41, at 43-44, RAnki, supra note 13, at 36, 39; (3) lack of incentive to increase
profitability, quality, or innovation, IVAN T. BEREND & GYORGY RAMct, THE HUN-
GARIAN ECONOMY IN THE 20TH CENTuRY 223 (1985), BEREND, supra note 6, at 6-7;
and (4) pricing systems which plan uniform prices for the entire CMEA, thereby
fixing prices for a five-year duration, no matter what factors change to affect the
supply and demand of goods and services during that period, AUSCH, supra note
41, at 77, Ranki, supra note 13, at 40.
This quantity based planning completely severs the production process from
a realistic valuation of goods or services, as prices only reflect the situation at a
Moscow planning session, not the true value of the good in a free market. AUSCH,
supra note 41, at 76-77. The pricing system for consumer goods in Hungary was
especially bad because it would affect only the demand for a product and never
the supply. RAnki, supra note 13, at 40-41. For example, if the plan had under-
valued the price of good X, the demand for the good for the entire five-year period
would be very high, while the supply of the good would be unable to expand any
more than productive capabilities would allow. Thus, the supply would remain
stagnant. Similarly, if the price of good Y were fixed too high, the demand for the
good would be very low. The supply as set in the plan was fixed, and could not
adapt to the low supply: the only way for the plant workers and managers to be
rewarded with bonuses would be to meet and even exceed the quota for that good.
The market then would have a surplus of good Y that nobody wanted to buy,
while the vast shortages of good X, which everyone wanted to purchase, would
remain. See generally BEREND, supra note 6, at 6; see also infra note 57.
44. BEREND, supra note 6, at 3. Stalin claimed that the banking system in
Hungary, although efficient in the competitive market, was improperly formulated
to deal with the Soviet goals of industrialization, full employment, and the estab-
lishment of collective industries in the CMEA group. Bdcskai, supra note 26, at
80. Had the Soviet regime recognized Hungary's strength in the banking market,
it could have utilized the system and efficiencies for the good of the entire CMEA.
Instead the industry was recreated in favor of a political ideology to the detriment
of the CMEA and Hungary itself. l~nki, supra note 13, at 36.
45. Rdnki, supra note 13, at 37; see also Bdcskai, supra note 26, at 82.
46. BEREND, supra note 6, at 3.
47. Id. Customer service was not an important market indicator during this
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private or public, to the goals and policies of the state.4" The
NBH soon became incredibly slow and inefficient due to its
large size and overwhelming communist bureaucracy.49
However beneficial the communist plan for banking looked
on paper, it did not function well in practice. By the mid-1950s
Hungarians were no longer enamored with the Soviet regime,
and their nationalist spirit re-emerged to regain power in their
country." Hungarian economists and non-Communist politi-
cians began to criticize centralized planning in the economy.5'
Jinos KAd6r, the head of the Hungarian Socialist Worker's
Party, argued that there was too much administration, bureau-
cracy, and over-centralization in the system, and he called for
the introduction of money market indicators to assure greater
independence for each industrialized firm." He suggested in-
fusing the command system with at least some level of market-
based indicators.53 However, this centralized system was slow
to make any changes, and on October 23, 1956, the Hungarian
people rioted in violent protest of the poor economic system
they were suffering under.54
period because banks had guaranteed markets in the planned system, and banks
did not have to institute any service initiatives to attract or maintain its custom-
ers. See generally RAnki, supra note 13, at 37.
48. RAnki, supra note 13, at 39. In fact, all banking decisions were made on a
macroeconomic level more similar to decisions of a public administration, with very
few traces of businesslike behavior. Bdcskai, supra note 26, at 82.
49. An example of this inefficiency was the "Single Accountancy System"
whereby each and every enterprise or private party in Hungary had one account
with the NBH. Bacskai, supra note 26, at 81; RAnki, supra note 13, at 37. The
execution of any transaction in the economy was "controlled by the forint," (the
Hungarian currency) meaning that it had a corresponding bank entry in the single
account. Bdcskai, supra note 26, at 81. The NBH was the state-wide auditor, and
had a mammoth staff to control, update, and monitor the activities of every forint
by recording and auditing it in the accounts. Rnki, supra note 13, at 37.
50. FED. RESEARCH Div. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 53.
51. BEREND & RANKI, supra note 43, at 224.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 227-29. See generally FED. RESEARCH DIV OF THE LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS, supra note 17, at 53. The rioting began as a massive student demonstra-
tion demanding improvements in the system. When the police shot into the crowd,
an armed group of protestors attacked the Hungarian Radio Building, and Hungar-
ian soldiers joined the revolutionaries in the uprising. Moscow responded by send-
ing Soviet tanks through the streets of Budapest, forcing more than 150,000 refu-
gees to flee Hungary afraid for their lives, never to return again. BEREND & RAN-
KI, supra note 43, at 225.
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C. The New Economic Mechanism
The Soviets soon realized that the problems of 1956 in
Hungary were more than mere student rebellions; the entire
population was disenchanted with the communist structure. In
order to maintain the integrity of the CMEA, Moscow began to
allow small reforms in Hungary to appease the unhappy popu-
lation." Finally, in 1968, the Hungarian government intro-
duced the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) to the Hungarian
citizens in an attempt to adapt the economy to the conditions
of the international division of labor and to guide investment
toward those sectors offering sure economic advantages. 8
Hungarians realized that they had forgotten how to be efficient
and how the demand for a product should affect the supply and
price of that product.57 The NEM's main policies were to con-
centrate on economic development, allowing for adaptations of
the five-year plan if the assumed and real external environ-
ment changed," and to "abandon centralized planning in fa-
vor of an organic combination of self-regulating market mecha-
nisms" exercised through indirect market pressures.59
Although the NEM was billed as the most sweeping reform
in the history of Hungary, the NEM included no banking re-
55. FED. RESEARCH DIv. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17 at 53-
54.
56. RICHET, supra note 15, at 3. See generally L~szl6 Csaba, The Recent Past
and the Future of the Hungarian Reform: An Overview and Assessment, in HUNGA-
RY: THE SECOND DECADE OF ECONOMIC REFORM-PERSPECTIVES ON EASTERN EU-
ROPE 13 (Roger Clarke ed., 1989) [hereinafter SECOND DECADE OF REFORM]; Paul
Marer, Market Mechanism Reforms in Hungary, in MARKET REFORMS IN SOCIALIST
SOCIETIES: COMPARING CHINA AND HUNGARY, supra note 13, at 54-55.
57. Mirton Tardos, Can Hungary's Monetary Policy Succeed?, in MONEY, IN-
CENTIVES, AND EFFICIENCY IN THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 26,
at 64 [hereinafter Monetary Policy].
[Tihe period following nationalization, when the role of money was
subordinated to the urge to fulfill plans, was not only marked by
naivet6 but was equally damaging to economic relations. Boosting
production often became an end in itself, and as such it did not help
meet human needs. Demand frequently remained unsatisfied, and
there was nothing to effectively stop the waste of resources and the
rapid increase in costs of production.
Id.
58. Bicskai, supra note 26, at 85.
59. Josef C. Brada & Istvan Dobozi, Economic Reform in Hungary-An Over-
view and Assessment, in MONEY, INCENTIVES AND EFFICIENCY IN THE HUNGARIAN
ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 26, at 3.
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form.60 The NEM failed to dismantle the communist central-
ized infrastructure, partly because the economy was not ready
to support such radical change,61 but also due to excessive
lobbying by officials of the various industries (including bank-
ing) to maintain their centralized power.62 Another factor add-
ing to the failure of NEM was that it was too ambitious in
light of the political and economic realities of Hungary. The
country maintained its fierce nationalism, but at the same
time, had to depend on the world market for most imports,
6 3
especially as it distanced itself from the CMEA export markets
of the Soviet Union.'
During the NEM, the NBH retained its huge monopoly,
while being allowed to play an increased role in financial man-
agement. 5 However, the NBH was not yet authorized to re-
fuse loans to development projects which were supported by
the government, nor could it refrain from loaning money to
enterprises whose solvency and ability to repay was question-
able.66 Therefore, although some effort was made to escape
the problems of a planned economy, the informal guidance
imposed on banks left the same economic constraints as exist-
ed during full Soviet domination.
As the 1970s and the NEM progressed, the economy began
to exhibit the deficiencies of a centralized banking system and
small meaningless reforms.6" The Arab oil crisis wreaked hav-
oc on the world market and the Hungarian trading economy.69
Planners realized for the first time that in order to have an
efficient economy, the regulators of the economy (including
60. FED. RESEARCH DIV. IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 56-
58.
61. Bdecskai, supra note 26, at 85-87.
62. FED. RESEARCH Div. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 58-
59.
63. See generally id.
64. Id. at 58.
65. Mdrton Tardos, Question Marks in Hungarian Monetary and Fiscal Policy,
in 33 ACTA OECONOMICA 29, 29 (1985), cited in Bdcskai, supra note 26, at 86.
66. Bdcskai, supra note 26, at 85. One study showed that although a small
liberalization occurred during NEM, allowing the NBH to make rational lending
decisions ten percent of the time the other ninety percent of loans were plan-ori-
ented investment decisions. BEREND, supra note 6, at 179.
67. RICHET, supra note 15, at x.
68. BEREND, supra note 6, at 194-95.
69. FED. RESEARCH Div. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 59-
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banks) must be free to adapt to changing circumstances at a
moment's notice.7 ° They realized that the government's at-
tempt to shield Hungary from world economic conditions could
not be continued in light of Hungary's dependency on foreign
trade, and that the Soviets' practice of rewarding inefficiency
instead of innovation had to be stopped.7
D. Bank Reform Efforts in the 1980s
Economic conditions in Hungary during the 1980s were
poor due to the world-wide recession as well as Hungarian
inferiority in the technological and financial areas.72 During
this period, the government could only attempt to resolve each
problem as it arose, and each reform made but a small dent in
the centralized Hungarian banking structure.73 However,
from 1981 to 1986, ten small commercial banks were estab-
lished in Hungary that were separate from the NBH, and
these banks were authorized to make lending decisions based
solely on rational economic criteria including advanced risk
analysis and other modern lending techniques.74 Two of these
banks were even granted permission by the Hungarian author-
ities to maintain a small amount of foreign investment. Be-
cause the Western investors wanted to protect their invest-
ment and see it grow, they introduced to Hungary's new bank-
ers the concepts of profit-oriented decision making based on
good banking indicators such as profitability and the ability to
repay.75 In early 1984, Citibank became the first foreign bank
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. GABOR RtSVEZ, PEREsTROIKA IN EASTERN EUROPE, HUNGARY'S ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION, 1945-1988, at 155 (1990). The Hungarian economy at this time
was about twenty years behind other European countries in terms of technological
advancement. Id. Furthermore, there was a period of uncontrolled inflation, which
caused consistent drops in the real wage level and the standard of living, leaving
more than twenty percent of the population living below the poverty level. Brada
& Dobozi, supra note 59, at 6. Moreover, for the first time, there was a shift in
the economy away from the heavy industry which had dominated the job market
since the early 1900s, and many people lost their jobs in the massive effort to
decentralize and modernize the economy. B6la Balassa, The Next Steps in Hungari-
an Economic Reform, in MONEY, INCENTIVES, AND EFFICIENCY IN THE HUNGARIAN
ECONOMIC REFORM, supra note 26, at 37-38.
73. RICHET, supra note 15, at vii.




authorized to conduct banking affairs in Hungary, albeit on
very restricted grounds.76
Finally, in late 1984, the government announced its policy
for reforming the banking system: it planned to create a sys-
tem in which functions of bank of issue (bank with the authori-
ty to issue currency), state financing, and commercial banking
would be separate.7 This policy expanded to include the goal
of attracting foreign investment in the commercial industries
via the use of joint ventures, and by late 1987, there were close
to 200 small joint ventures with foreign capital in the banking
industry alone.7"
However, the Socialist party, which maintained strict
allegiance to the ideals of centralized planning,79 and a na-
tion-wide debt crisis between 1984 and 1987, conspired to slow
reform efforts.80 Hungary was slowly realizing that her main
concerns had to be to attract foreign investment in the com-
mercial industries and to re-educate the population about effi-
cient economic management. It had become painfully obvious
that the partial reform efforts of the early to mid-1980s were
further hindering the economy instead of helping it to sur-
vive."' The government finally instituted a massive reform of
the banking system in 1987 which included real opportunities
76. RICHET, supra note 15, at 169-70. Citibank operated partially in forints,
and was not allowed to underwrite insurance, give credit to Hungarian citizens, or
trade in rubles. The bank was allowed only to deal with certain specified commer-
cial transactions. Id.
77. BEREND, supra note 6, at 254. The government also announced that the
general economic policy was to support the "real emergence of more efficient eco-
nomic activity . . . " by developing a true system of competitive economic manage-
ment. Id.
78. RPStVEZ, supra note 72, at 1-32.
79. FED. RESEARCH DIV. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 118.
80. Riding the Tiger, supra note 8; Rough Transition, supra note 8, at 2A; see
also Catch a Falling Star, supra note 11. Since Hungary was still completely de-
pendent on imports, and their exports were never enough to finance these pur-
chases, Hungary owed billions to the various economic superpowers around the
world. For example, by 1993, net foreign debt was approximately 22.6 billion Unit-
ed States dollars. See Riding the Tiger, supra note 8. Furthermore, the gross do-
mestic debt grew to over 18 billion United States dollars due to the continued
permissive environment in the banking industry towards insolvency, obsolescence,
negligence, and lack of market performance. Csaba, supra note 56, at 21. For
example, during this period, if an enterprise couldn't pay back its short-term loan,
the auditors at the NBH would change it from a short-term debt to a long term
liability on the balance sheet in order to avoid the firm's default. Id.
81. Marer, supra note 56, at 57-58.
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for foreign money and expertise for the first time.82
E. The 1987 Banking Reform
Based on the horrors of Hungary's economic performance
in the 1980s, it became Hungary's new official policy to try to
attract the capital and expertise of multinational corporations
on a large scale, despite the nationalistic fear of over-depen-
dency on foreigners for their infrastructure or money. 3 Fur-
thermore, remembering the failures of the NEM and its lack of
structural regulatory reform, on January 1, 1987, the banking
system was completely re-created and the huge Hungarian
monobank was replaced by a two-tierred decentralized sys-
tem.' The NBH was the first tier of the new system. Its du-
ties were those of a central bank, including controlling the
monetary supply, controlling international transactions, and
acting as the bank of issue for all credit transactions. 5 A sys-
tem of commercial banks separate from the NBH, which work
on a competitive profit-seeking basis, formed the second tier;86
however, the NBH still directly handled all foreign banking
due to the importance of maintaining strong relations with
Hungary's trading partners. 7 Since these new banks were
required to be profitable, the 1987 law suggested certain mini-
mum standards for making lending decisions. Therefore, before
a bank could loan any money to an enterprise, the bank would
consider both the profitability threshold and the general eco-
nomic well-being of this firm to determine its ability to repay
the loan.88
82. Id. For a general description of the relevant banking law and reforms, see
FED. RESEARCH Div. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17.
83. Marer, supra note 56, at 59; see also supra note 19 and accompanying
text.
84. FED. RESEARCH Div. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17; DEWEY
BALLANTINE THEODORE GODDARD, supra note 17, at 80; BEREND, supra note 6, at
270; see also Kim Reisman, Note, The World Bank and the IMF: at the Forefront
of World Transformation, 60 FORDHAMi L. REV. 349, 365 (1992).
85. BEREND, supra note 6, at 270.
86. Id.
87. FED. RESEARCH Div. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 126.
Hungary was spending sixty-five to seventy percent of all foreign currency just
servicing its trade deficit to the West and decided to maintain a uniform national
policy toward its growing international debt. Id.
88. RICHET, supra note 15, at 137. The profitability thresholds were based on
figures between seven and twenty percent, depending on the industry.
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The new law had several important effects on the banking
sector. For the first time, managers of banks were required to
be realistic about the various market forces such as supply,
demand, and profitability. The banks were now free to lend
money to whomever they decided was the best risk, and were
not forced to give loans to inefficient enterprises because of a
government plan. 9 The credit banks were also free to collect
the deposits of the same customers to whom they lent money,
thereby better servicing their customers. ° If a bank were
profitable, the government would impose a newly written in-
come tax on the profit. However, for the first time, if the bank
was losing money, it was to be held accountable for the losses
and not subsidized by the government.91 Furthermore, the
population of Hungary was now given its choice of competing
banking institutions, which meant that the banks had to in-
voke some service initiatives for the first time to attract and
maintain customers.92
However, the 1987 reform was not to be the last of the
regulatory revisions. It was soon obvious that the NBH still
maintained too much control over the financial services sector.
In fact, in 1991, the NBH owned almost half of the total out-
standing stock of the six largest Hungarian banks.93 Further-
more, the commercial customers of the banks (the various
Hungarian enterprises) also often owned large percentages of
shares in the banks, placing the customers in a position to
depend on unfair leniency from the bank officials. 94
In June 1988, Hungary signed a ten-year agreement with
the EC which would progressively reduce the barriers to trade
between the two parties.95 However, this put pressure on
89. Balassa, supra note 72, at 46-47.
90. Id. Under the previous system, the enterprise had to go to the Investment
Bank for a loan, and the National Savings Bank to deposit any savings.
91. Id.
92. Tardos, supra note 57, at 72-73.
93. Hungary's New Banking Law, supra note 8. The NBH held the following
amounts: Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank (44%), Hungarian Credit Bank (49.3%),
Budapest Bank (41%), National Commercial and Credit Bank (35%), General Bank-
ing and Trust Co. (50%), and Industrial Development Bank (68.75%). Id.
94. Csaba, supra note 56, at 22. This state of affairs is called the "Yugoslav
Syndrome," because most of the Yugoslavian financial services market is owned by
a few large industrial monopolies who have the power to lobby for loan forgiveness
on a regular basis. Id.
95. Steven Nisbet, EC Leaders to Help E. Europe On Road To Join EC, REU-
1995] 687
688 BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XX:3
Hungary to look at its past and continuing failures in all areas
of reform, 6 and impose radical structural-level changes in the
banking industry.
F. The New Hungarian Banking Law of 1991
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Hungary finally
realized that due to its dependency on foreign trade, it had to
create an internationally efficient banking and financing struc-
ture. 7 The Hungarian government also realized that each
time it attempted to shield the various industries from in-
creased foreign competition, it rewarded inefficiencies, and
made the already burdensome trade deficits larger and more
TERS NEWSWIRE, June 18, 1993, available in WESTLAW INT-NEWS-C FILE.
96. Hungary was once considered the darling of the Eastern European nations
because of its early grand scheme to reform the country into a competitive mar-
ket-based economy. Catch a Falling Star, supra note 11. However, efforts at decen-
tralization and privatization in the business field have stagnated, while the popu-
lation of Hungary is suffering under living standards which as of July 1993, are
twenty percent lower than they were in 1987 and unemployment which is fourteen
percent higher and rising. Where Patience is a Virtue, THE BANKER, July 1993,
available in LEXIS, BANKNG Library, FINTME File [hereinafter Patience]. Add to
that a world-wide recession, and the reformers in Hungary were sure a major
change needed to occur. Id
However, a large continuing problem for Hungary is that she does not have
a competent labor force to succeed in Western-style firms requiring accounting,
financing, and a competitive and innovative spirit. Foreign companies who do come
to do business in Hungary often maintain a policy to only hire Eastern European
employees in their twenties who "still have initiative and [who] can learn, unlike
those with 15 years' experience in the state sector." Ken Kasriel, Sony Finds Foot-
hold in Hungarian Markets, BILLBOARD, Aug. 7, 1993, at 37; Sloan, supra note 19,
at 78. However, as Hungary continues to induce more foreign investment into the
country, highly skilled specialists will no doubt follow to establish a structure for
the westernization of the Hungarian labor pool. Nigel Ash, Hungary: Privatization
Programme Needs an Overhaul, REUTERS TEXTLINE-EUROMONEY SUPP., April 15,
1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, EURRPT File. For example, there is a
Canadian program which brings retired and unemployed executives from the Unit-
ed States and Canada to volunteer in Hungarian firms to help them adapt their
philosophies and practices to Western standards. Neville Nankivell, Hungary: Vol-
unteers Tackle Eastern Europe-Unemployed Executives Hard at Work, FIN. POST,
August 14, 1993, at 9, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS-C File. Hungarian offi-
cials hope that the accumulation of these efforts in conjunction with increased
foreign investment in the banking sector will speed up the process of
westernization so that the EC will begin membership negotiations soon. Visegrad,
supra note 5, at 1.
97. FED. RESEARCH Div. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 17, at 149-
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difficult to maintain.98 Using their knowledge of these past
failures, while keeping in mind Hungary's refusal to become
subordinated to foreign pressures, the Hungarian legislature
created the new banking law to attempt to deal with these
past problems and future goals.
On November 13, 1991, the Hungarian government passed
Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activities.99 As a
whole, the act provides the legal framework for the establish-
ment and operation of commercial and retail banks other than
the central and international banking institutions in Hungary.
It creates a banking structure that accommodates many differ-
ent types of internationally competitive banking institutions
for the first time.' The goals of the law are two-fold: to im-
plement the new governmental policy of encouraging foreign
investment,' and to bring Hungary within the provisions re-
quired of EC banks in order to facilitate more trade talks.0 2
The law addresses six main areas: (1) the establishment
requirements for banks in Hungary;0 3 (2) the Hungarian reg-
ulation of any foreign-owned banks;0 4 (3) the minimum fi-
nancial standards required for the establishment of any
bank;"5 (4) the treatment required of foreign countries to-
wards Hungarian banks abroad;' 8 (5) the ownership limita-
tions of banking institutions in Hungary; and (6) the limit-
98. Id. at 160-61.
99. See Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, translated in 2
Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1779 (1991).
100. See generally Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity trans-
lated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1785. The banking law permits the
following types of banks in Hungary: commercial banks, specialized banking insti-
tutions, investment banks, savings banks, banking groups, branches and bank
representations. Id. art. 5.
101. See Hungary's New Banking Law, supra note 8. Tamas Rusznak, deputy
head of the state banking supervision agency of Hungary, was quoted as saying,
'[als soon as possible, Hungarian financial institutions should fulfill the require-
ments of a market economy. They should be able to enter international monetary
and capital markets, and they should be able to provide services attractive for
domestic and foreign investors." Id.
102. Visegrad, supra note 5.
103. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 15, translated
in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1791.
104. Id. arts. 82-85, translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1835.
105. Id. art. 8(4)(a) (paid-in-capital), art. 23(1) (solvency), translated in 2 Hun-
garian Rules of Law in Force at 1787-88, 1797.
106. Id. art. 15(4)(d), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1791.
107. Id. arts. 15(1), 18, translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at
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ed types of banking activities authorized in Hungary.'
III. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
On January 1, 1958, the Treaty of Rome entered into force,
establishing the European Community (EC) among the nations
of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and
West Germany."9 The main objective was to provide for a
single economic central market for European trade and com-
merce."' The founding nations had been totally devastated
by World War II, and their desire to maintain national sover-
eignty"' was overcome by the hope that "the nations of Eu-
rope, tempered by centuries of war, [could] mature into a
peaceful trading partnership.""' The main goal of the EC
was, and is today, to combine the best resources of each mem-
ber state to create the most efficient economic system possible
for the betterment of all nations involved.'
However, in order to establish commonalities among the
member states, the varying internal laws of each nation had to
be harmonized to the least common denominator."4 To
achieve this common market, Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome
provided three main objectives for the Community: the elimi-
nation of customs duties, the abolition of obstacles to freedom
of movement, and the harmonization of municipal laws to
assimilate the markets of all member states. 5 Because the
enactment of any legislation requires the unanimous adoption
1791-92, 1794.
108. Id. art. 33, translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1801-02.
109. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREA-
TY].
110. Mark A. Goldstein, 1992 and the FCN and OECD Obligations of EEC
Member States to the United States in the Financial Services Area, 30 VA. J. INVL
L. 189 (1989).
111. Id. at 190.
112. David H. Lui, Europe 1992-A Banker's Guide to the European
Community's 1992 Program, 107 BANKING L.J. 148 (1990).
113. Christopher T. Toll, The European Community's Second Banking Directive:
Can Antiquated United States Legislation Keep Pace?, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
615, 616-17 (1990).
114. Id. at 624.
115. Uwe H. Schneider, The Harmonization of EC Banking Laws: The Euro-
Passport to Profitability and International Competitiveness of Financial Institutions,
22 LAW & POLY INT'L BUS. 261, 264 (1991); see also EEC TREATY, art. 3.
690 [Vol. XX:3
HUNGARIAN BANKING LAW
by the EC's Council,"' each country can block a directive if it
feels that the law does not sufficiently address its individual
needs. This effective veto makes harmonization a very slow
and painful process of continuous compromises."'
In the mid to late-1980s, the White Paper set out the EC's
most sweeping reform efforts to date toward its goal of creating
the Single European Internal Market."' The White Paper es-
tablished a timetable for removing all remaining nontariff
barriers (such as discriminatory legislation in member states)
by 1992, and included the harmonization of the financial ser-
vices industry on a Community-wide basis."
A. General EC Concepts and Provisions
In order to effectuate the full harmonization of laws
among the member states, Article 52 of the Treaty of Rome
provides for Freedom of Establishment. Article 52 states: "re-
strictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a
Member State in the territory of another Member State shall
be progressively abolished" in the course of a transitional peri-
od.120
Thus, following the transition, all EC citizens were enti-
tled to establish business undertakings as freely throughout
the EC as he or she was allowed to in his or her own nation.
This "Freedom of Establishment" was then further specified in
a Council Directive obligating all member states to abolish any
116. Goldstein, supra note 110, at 195.
117. Id. at 195-97.
118. Opinion 'On Completing the Internal Market'-White Paper from the Com-
mission to the European Council, 1985 O.J. (C 344) 16 [hereinafter White Paper].
The four goals of the Internal Market are to maintain free access to national mar-
kets for goods, mutual recognition of state laws, minimum harmonization, and
home state control. Schneider, supra note 115, at 266-67.
The European Commission (the legislators of the EC) issued the White
Paper in 1985, listing the various stages which would need to be completed before
the "Internal Market" could be complete. They set a deadline of 1992 for the com-
plete harmonization and adoption of the Single European Act throughout Europe.
Kessler, supra note 9, at 396-97. It was in the White Paper that the EC first
stated its goal of mutual recognition of each member state's laws as the most
efficient way to become a truly common market. Kessler, supra note 9, at 397.
119. Goldstein, supra note 110, at 195-96.
120. EEC TREATY art. 52. Article 59 then went on to state that restrictions on
the freedom to provide services within the Community would also be progressively
abolished. Id. art. 59.
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restrictions on foreign participation in banking and savings
and loan undertakings. 12' The goal in the EC today is to es-
tablish a "single market" specifically for financial services. The
Community hopes to accomplish this single market in three
ways: (1) by harmonizing the essential supervision of banking
for the protection of investors; (2) by mutually recognizing each
member state's application of those banking standards; and (3)
by maintaining home country control over financial institutions
operating in other member states.122 In order to meet these
lofty goals, the EC passed two key banking directives-the first
in 1977,123 and the second in 1989.24
B. The First Banking Directive
One of the first priorities of the EC's banking directives
was to set certain uniform minimum standards for all banking
institutions in the EC.125 According to the First Banking Di-
rective, each national of a member state who wishes to estab-
lish a credit institution in another member state must first
obtain authorization from that state by meeting threshold
requirements such as minimum funding, and ownership crite-
ria.126 After satisfying these minimum requirements, the Free-
121. Council Directive 73/183 EEC of 28 June 1973 on the Abolition of Restric-
tions on Freedom of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services in Respect of
Self-Employed Activities of Banks and other Financial Institutions, 1973 O.J. (L
194) 1.
122. Kessler, supra note 9, at 397. See generally Schneider, supra note 115, at
269.
123. First Council Directive 77/780 EEC of 12 December 1977 on the Coordina-
tion of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up
and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, 1977 O.J. (L 322) 30 [hereinaf-
ter First Banking Directive].
124. Second Council Directive 89/646 EEC of 15 December 1989 on the Coordi-
nation of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking
Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive
771780/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1 [hereinafter Second Banking Directive].
125. First Banking Directive, supra note 123, arts. 3(2), 7(1); see also Douglas
L. Hymas, The European Community's Second Banking Directive and U.S. Banking
Regulation: Preparing for a Multilateral Agreement for the Trade of Services, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1687, 1691 (1990); Toll, supra note 113, at 619-20.
126. First Banking Directive, supra note 123, art. 3; see also Kessler, supra
note 9, at 400 n.30. The requirements for authorization listed in the First Banking
Directive are the following: a minimum amount of separate "own" funds (art. 3(2)),
two directors of the bank "who effectively direct the business of the credit institu-
tion" (art. 3(2)), and strict disclosure and supervision provisions to monitor liquidi-
ty and solvency (art. 7(1)). First Banking Directive, supra note 123, art. 3(2), 7(1).
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dom of Establishment clause provided by the Treaty of Rome
permits that institution to set up as many offices or branches
of that bank as it wishes within the same country with no
further authorization necessary.'27 Moreover, authorization
must be granted on the basis of nondiscriminatory national
treatment, i.e., the foreign institution must be evaluated under
the same standards as those applied to a home state institu-
tion.2' Finally, the First Banking Directive left all govern-
mental control of the bank to the "host" state, the state in
which the bank is located. This provided a strong incentive for
banks seeking to invest abroad to forum shop for the EC host
nation with the least intrusive banking regulations.'29
Although the First Banking Directive liberalized many of
the procedures previously required to establish a bank after its
acceptance by a member state, many significant restrictions on
foreign participation in the financial services sector remained.
First, EC institutions had to obtain authorization from each
separate member state before being permitted to participate in
any banking activity in that country, even if that institution
had already received authorization in another EC state.
30
Second, the institution was subject to supervision by the host
country, and thus, may have been limited in its scope of busi-
ness activities by the host country's laws.'31 Finally, the First
Banking Directive did not liberate the procedure required for
non-EC nationals seeking to set up financial institutions in
member states."2
These remaining obstacles to foreign participation in the
127. First Banking Directive, supra note 123, arts. 3(2)-(3); cf. Second Banking
Directive, supra note 124, arts. 19(1), 20(1).
128. First Banking Directive, supra note 123, art. 4; Hymas, supra note 125, at
1691-92.
129. First Banking Directive, supra note 123, art. 4; see also Schneider, supra
note 115, at 272 (ninth principal).
130. Kessler, supra note 9, at 399; see also First Banking Directive, supra note
123, art. 3(1).
131. First Banking Directive, supra note 123, art. 4(1); Michael Gruson & Wer-
ner Nikowitz, The Second Banking Directive of the European Economic Community
and its Importance for Non-EEC Banks, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 205, 210 (1989);
Kessler, supra note 9, at 399.
132. First Banking Directive, supra note 123, art. 9(1); Kessler, supra note 9,
at 399. A non-EC national was left to the discriminatory legislation of the various
member states, and was required to receive national permission before opening up
each and every new banking institution.
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financial services sector were inconsistent with the lofty goals
of the Treaty of Rome, particularly the "Internal Market." 3'
The theory behind the EC was to create a uniform single mar-
ket without barriers of any kind."4 However, the First Bank-
ing Directive, while comprehensive in its scope, left many bar-
riers within the EC untouched.'35 After all, one of the so-
called pillars of the single market is the removal of member
state barriers to allow for financial services throughout the
European Community. Thus, the obstacles remaining in the
First Banking Directive had to be eliminated.3 '
C. The Second Banking Directive
In an effort to remedy the shortcomings of the First Direc-
tive, in late 1989, the EC's Council passed the Second Banking
Directive." 7 The Second Directive sought to move the EC clo-
ser to its goal of a fully integrated single market in the finan-
cial services market than had the First Directive. 8' The Sec-
ond Banking Directive effectively removes all restrictions in
the establishment of banking institutions by EC nationals as
well as non-EC nationals. 3 9 This freedom of establishment is
133. See supra note 118.
134. E. Waide Warner, "Mutual Recognition" and Cross-Border Financial Servic-
es in the European Community, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7 (1992).
135. Toll, supra note 113, at 620-21.
136. Warner, supra note 134, at 7.
137. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 124; Kessler, supra note 9, at
400.
138. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124.
Before passing this Directive, the EC passed several other regulations relat-
ing to specific minimum requirements for banking institutions in the EC. The first
in the series required a fund which must be maintained with the credit institu-
tion's "own capital." Proposal for a Council Directive of the Owns Funds of Credit
Institutions, 1986 O.J. (C 243). The second such regulation set the Commission's
requirements on supervising large exposures of credit institutions. Commission
Recommendation 87/62 EEC of 22 December 1986 on Monitoring and Controlling
Large Exposures of Credit Institutions, 1987 O.J. (L 33) 10. Finally, the Commis-
sion laid out specific guidelines for the required solvency ratio for credit institu-
tions. Council Directive 89/647 EEC of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency Ratio for
Credit Institutions 1989 O.J. (L 386) 14 [hereinafter Solvency Directive].
139. See generally First Banking Directive, supra note 123. The First Banking
Directive had required a separate authorization for new banking institutions in
other member states (art. 3(1)), subjected out-of-state banks to the laws of the
host state (art. 4), and failed to liberate the procedure by which non-EC nationals
could get an EC banking license (art. 9(1)). First Banking Directive, supra note
123, arts. 3(1), 4, 9(1). By comparison, the Second Banking Directive authorizes
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known as the "Single Passport,"14 and operates by allowing
any institution which meets the minimum requirements in any
one state immediately to gain the right to operate throughout
the entire EC." Thus, under the Second Banking Directive,
any credit institution which is authorized to do business in the
financial services market in any EC member state will be able
to establish branches and offer its services freely throughout
the entire Community.'
The Second Banking Directive addresses six main areas:
(1) the Single Passport establishment concept;4 . (2) the regu-
lation of the bank by its "home" country;44 (3) the minimum
standards required before being granted a license;'45 (4) the
requirement that EC banks in non-EC countries be given "re-
ciprocal" treatment by that host state;'46 (5) the complete lib-
eration on the amount of stock any party can maintain in the
banks;147 and (6) the allowance for "universal banking" autho-
rizing EC banks to engage in almost any banking or financial
activity. 148
the "single license" whereby one license from any member state authorizes a bank
to offer services freely throughout the EC (arts. 19 & 20), permits out-of-state
banks to remain under the regulation of its home laws, regardless of the host
state's laws (arts. 10-17), and liberates the procedure by which any party, whether
an EC national or not may receive an EC banking license (arts. 19-20). Second
Banking Directive, supra note 124, arts. 19-20, 10-17.
140. Patrick M. Creaven, Note, Inside Outside Leave Me Alone: Domestic and
EC-Motivated Reform in the UK Securities Industry, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S285,
S305 (1992). The single passport is the term used to describe the ability granted
an EC firm in one member state to begin businesses in any other member state.
Id. at S305 n.165.
141. Lawrence Mattis et. al., Hungary Ratifies EC Agreement, 5 P-H J. PROPRI-
ETARY RTs. 25, 25 (1993), available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL File (discussing the
access to 350 million EC residents immediately).
142. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, arts. 19(1), 20(1).
143. Id. recital 4 & arts. 19(1), 20(1).
144. Id. arts. 10-17.
145. Id. arts. 4-7. Home country regulation and minimum authorization require-
ments make up the concept of "mutual recognition" which is integral to EC legis-
lation. Warner, supra note 134, at 8. Provided that an establishment meets the
universal requirements, the national license will be recognized as valid in all
member states, regardless of the specific differences between national laws because
all EC member states will mutually recognize each other's municipal banking laws.
Id.
146. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, arts. 8-9.
147. The Second Banking Directive has no provision limiting any ownership
percentages.
148. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, art. 18, annex A.
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D. Banking in the EC Today
Generally, the EC member states are hopeful that the
Second Banking Directive's approach will ultimately prove
beneficial. However, because EC Council directives are not self-
executing, it will take some time for the many banking barri-
ers to be eliminated from the national laws of the European
nations due to the stubborn nature of national traditions."'
Before the Second Banking Directive was fully implemented,
most EC banks, preparing for the increased competition ex-
pected from the formation of a single market, tried to fortify
their market share in hopes that their financial strength would
protect them.50 However, many believe that the regionalist
trends of language and culture which were prevalent histori-
cally will persist, and that banking products will continue to be
offered in regional areas, thereby eliminating the possibility of
one huge Pan-European bank to serve the entire EC. 5' Fur-
thermore, because some EC nations are better poised to take
advantage of this new directive than others, some EC states
fear that their banks will drown in this new financial ocean of
possibilities.
For example, banks in Germany and the United Kingdom
are well situated to take full advantage of the integrated mar-
ket because their systems already allow them to offer the full
range of services (i.e., universal banking) authorized in the
Second Banking Directive. 5 ' Luxembourg is also well poised
149. Kessler, supra note 9, at 412.
150. Gordon Platt, One-Mart Banking in Europe Nearing, J. CoM., Feb. 26,
1988, at IA; available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, JOC File. The smaller banks are
merely looking to form alliances, while the mega-banks like Deutsche Bank in
Germany are already buying up banks in newly opening markets. Id.
151. Kessler, supra note 9, at 412. Kessler explains that the various regions
will be a German group, a French group, a British group and a Danish group. Id.
at 412 n.170; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve?
The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 968 (1992).
152. Kessler, supra note 9, at 414; see supra note 26 and accompanying text
for a definition of universal banking. Both of these banks have used universal
banking for years very efficiently, and their experience and existing market share
will make them almost indestructible in the early years of the single banking
market. Platt, supra note 150. German banks can not only engage in investment
banking and deposit taking, but they may participate in real estate, insurance,
travel agency, gold banking, and nonbanking activities. Schneider, supra note 115,
at 279. Germany is considered the most liberal in the evolution of universal bank-
ing. William Boger, III, Banking Reform in the 102d Congress-Glasnost for Glass-
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for the integration, because it has traditionally had very loose
regulation and has historically welcomed foreign banking par-
ticipation in its domestic financial markets.153 Belgian, Dan-
ish, and Dutch banks, while retaining some weaknesses from
their formerly centralized systems, are generally very well
capitalized and efficient, and are expected to meet the EC
requirements easily, though their relatively smaller sizes may
hurt them competitively against the super-banks of Germany
and the United Kingdom. '54
By comparison, Spanish, French, and Irish banks are not
yet prepared to meet the requirements of the highly competi-
tive single passport system because of the painfully slow pro-
cess of deregulating their formerly centralized systems.'55
Furthermore, banking in these countries tends to be very ex-
pensive locally, even if their banks do compete somewhat inter-
nationally.'56 Finally, the banks in Italy, Portugal, and
Greece are not prepared for the competition, and most believe
that the single market will destroy these government-con-
trolled, inefficient, and poorly capitalized banks, despite the
Steagall?, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 1003, 1019 (1991).
153. Kessler, supra note 9, at 414.
Some economists are concerned that a "race to the bottom" will occur in the
EC. This race occurs where each member state attempts to have the least intru-
sive banking regulations, which will in effect, create a lack of stability in the
laws. The race to the bottom has turned into a reality in American corporations
law. Delaware's state incorporation laws are very liberal in the hope that they will
attract more companies because the fees and taxes collected are a huge source of
revenue for the state. Delaware has apparently won the race because they main-
tain the largest percentage of all incorporated companies in the country, despite
its small size. JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
17-18 (3d ed. 1989). Critics 'of the race to the bottom argue that such loose corpo-
rate regulation does not benefit the small shareholder, but is merely for the self-
ish interests of the board of directors and large owners. Id.
154. Kessler, supra note 9, at 414.
155. Hugh F. Hall, International Law, in Developments in Banking, 1993 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 189, 210-11. In fact, French banks have been nationalized since
1946, and the liberalization and privatization process has been slow. The govern-
ment still has much control, if not overtly, then indirectly through policy power.
Id. Similarly, the banks in Italy are still very influenced by the fears of the Great
Depression and their banking activities are very restricted by overly strict regula-
tion. Schneider, supra note 115, at 279.
156. Kessler, supra note 9, at 415-16.
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benefits that will flow to the other industries and private par-
ties in these nations.
157
IV. COMPARISON
Both the new Hungarian Banking Law and the EC's Sec-
ond Banking Directive seem to address the same basic issues
in their provisions, but at the same time they maintain several
critical differences. While it is important to note the textual
differences between the laws, it is more critical to view the
effect that these differences will have on the banking markets
in Hungary, in light of Hungary's goals of encouraging interna-
tional investment in its banking system and gaining full EC
membership.
A. Hungarian Banking Law Provisions
Hungary enacted the new banking law in 1991 in response
to the critical economic situation in the late 1980s and early
1990s. The Hungarian Parliament implemented the new plan
with three main purposes in mind: to "encourage savings and
increase the confidence in banking institutions of depositors
and investors; ... [to] facilitate the regulation of banking ac-
tivity with a view to promote free enterprise; [and to] gradual-
ly integrate the Hungarian banking system into the interna-
tional one . ,, ." The various provisions of the law attempt
to liberalize the procedure for both domestic and foreign es-
tablishment of banks in Hungary, to encourage foreign invest-
ment in Hungary, and to help the domestic economy recover
from years of suffering and neglect."5 9
1. Establishment
Article 15 of the new law provides that a banking institu-
tion may be formed with partial or full foreign ownership and
that branches of foreign banking institutions may be opened in
Hungary for the first time. 60 Furthermore, "a banking insti-
157. Id. at 416-17.
158. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, pmbl., translated in
2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1779.
159. Hungary's New Banking Law, supra note 8.
160. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 15(1), translat.
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tution may be established in full or in part by a foreigner...
on the condition that the foreigner" meets certain business re-
quirements, and places a certain amount of capital in a Hun-
garian bank.' The directors of any bank (foreign or domes-
tic) must also prove to be versed in both the Hungarian lan-
guage and the Banking Law before establishment will be au-
thorized.162 These language and culture requirements are
most likely derivatives of nationalist tendencies and Hungary's
desire to protect the Hungarian language and values. If a for-
eign banking institution does not want to set up an incorporat-
ed office in Hungary, Chapter IX of the law allows foreign
banking institutions to "set up long term bank representations"
(i.e., branch offices) in Hungary by following the additional re-
quirements of Article 15 for foreign authorizations.'63
2. Country of Regulation
Hungary's new banking law requires complete host state
control in its regulation of both foreign and domestic
banks.'" The 1991 law states that any banking institution
offering its services in Hungary, whether incorporated inside
or outside of Hungary, must be governed by Hungarian law,
again fortifying the nationalist tendencies of the Hungarian
governments.'65 Therefore, if a foreign entity establishes a
banking institution in Hungary, that foreigner's home state
can have no further control over its banking activities, nor can
it authorize the bank to engage in activities inconsistent with
Hungarian law.
ed in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1791-92.
161. Id. art. 15(3)(a)-(d), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at
92.
162. Id. art. 15(4)(a)0(c), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at
92. The directors must also promise to train Hungarian employees in competitive
banking systems, showing the Hungarian government's desire to reverse the stag-
nation effect in their labor pool left from the Soviet regime.
163. Id. art. 82(1), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1829;
see also supra text accompanying note 161 for a list of the additional requirements
for a foreign banking institution.
164. Id. art. 15(7), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1792-
93.
165. Id. art. 83, translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1829 (for-
eign investors are also subject to Hungarian law).
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3. Minimum Requirements
Article 15 of the new Hungarian banking law also estab-
lishes the minimum requirements for authorization of foreign
or domestic banks. A bank must have paid-in-capital of its own
funds of five million forints before it can be authorized.166
Furthermore, the bank must maintain a solvency ratio67 of
eight percent or higher at all times, or the bank's charter will
be revoked. 6 ' These minimum requirements ensure that a
bank is adequately capitalized to cover loans and deposits of
the customers in cases of default, a safeguard similar to self-
insurance by banks of customer deposits.6 9 These provisions
are part of the effort to foster confidence in the Hungarian
banking industry for both Hungarians and foreigners alike.
4. Foreign Treatment
The new Hungarian banking law requires that its banks
abroad be treated with "identical" national treatment. 7 ' Spe-
cifically, Article 15 provides that before a foreigner's licensing
request will be granted, the Banking Supervisory Body (BSB)
in Hungary must first verify that a similar Hungarian bank,
set up in that bank's home nation, will receive treatment at
least as favorable as the type of treatment which Hungary
affords foreign banks.' This provision assures Hungarian
banks that they will have at least equal opportunities to merge
into the international financial services community.
166. Id. art. 8(4)(a), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1788.
167. Solvency ratio is defined generally as a proportion of a bank's own avail-
able capital divided by its risk-adjusted assets. Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee
International Capital Adequacy Standards: Analysis and Implications for the Bank-
ing Industry, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 189, 196-97 (1992).
168. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, arts. 23(1), 27,
translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1797, 1798-99 (requiring guar-
anteed solvency).
169. See generally Alford, supra note 167. It is generally agreed that insurance
and minimum capital standards "help maintain the safety and soundness of the
global system." Nancy Worth, Harmonizing Capital Adequacy Rules of International
Banks and Securities Firms, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMP. REG. 133, 135 (1992).
170. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 15(4)(d), trans-





Hungary's new banking law retains several important
restrictions on the ownership of Hungarian banks. Article 18 of
the law states that "[tihe proportion of direct or indirect shares
for each owner of the subscribed capital ... must not exceed
twenty-five percent."'72 This provision prohibits both foreign
and domestic owners of any banking institution from owning
more than twenty-five percent of any banking institution. In
one small liberalization, Article 18 exempts banking institu-
tions who effectuate merger transactions in Hungary from this
twenty-five percent limitation, thereby allowing banks (and no
other type of business venture) to purchase one hundred per-
cent of the stock in an existing Hungarian bank.'73
Article 15 further limits ownership possibilities by provid-
ing that "a foreign person may hold interest in banking institu-
tions incorporated in Hungary ... unless the total foreign
interests exceed ten percent of the subscribed capital of the
banking institution."' 4 While the 1991 law allows foreigners
to own parts of banking institutions in Hungary, a foreigner
seeking to acquire more than ten percent of a pre-existing
Hungarian institution must apply for permission from the
NBH. Furthermore, before the NBH grants its approval, it
must present its findings to the BSB in order to qualify for full
official authorization.'75  Because possible discrimination
against foreign involvement may stem from Hungarian fears of
foreign power over the economy and politics, foreigners seeking
to acquire more than ten percent of a Hungarian banking insti-
tution may be thwarted by arbitrary official decision making.
172. Id. art. 18(1), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1794.
The purpose of this limitation was to reduce the NBH's virtual monopoly control
in the commercial banks in Hungary. Therefore by 1994, NBH must not hold more
than 25% of any of Hungary's banks. See supra note 93 regarding the holdings of
the NBH in 1991.
173. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 18(1), translat-
ed in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1794.
174. Id. art. 15(1), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1791-
92.
175. Id. art. 15(4)-(6), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at
1792.
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6. Authorized Banking Activities
Finally, the new banking law retains many important
limitations on the types of activities in which Hungarian banks
may engage. Article 33 prohibits banks from engaging in the
management of investment funds,'76 and severely restricts
banks if they try to undertake insurance activities,'77 engage
in securities transactions, 7 or partake of certain commercial
transactions.'79 This provision absolutely precludes the use of
universal banking' which is widely authorized throughout
most of the EC, and a key provision of the Second Banking
Directive.
B. EC Banking Directive Provisions
The EC's Second Banking Directive was passed in order to
eliminate the various barriers to interstate banking within the
EC. The provisions are aimed both at liberating the restric-
tions to interstate banking, and at setting clear minimum
standards for the establishment of banks resulting in better
customer protections within the EC.'8' Any remaining restric-
tions appear to be aimed not at restricting intra-EC banking,
but rather as leverage to force non-EC states to open up their
financial services markets to EC banks. After all, the EC
states wanted to ensure true regulatory liberation in the finan-
cial services market.'82
1. Establishment
The EC's Second Banking Directive addresses the issue of
bank establishment by permitting a license acquired in any
member state to be valid throughout the entire EC. 8' Fur-
176. Id. art. 33(1), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1801.
177. Id. art. 33(2), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1801.
178. Id. art. 33(4), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1802.
179. Id. art. 33(3), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1801-
02.
180. See supra note 26 for a definition of universal banking.
181. Michael Gruson & Wolfgang Feuring, The New Banking Law of the Euro-
pean Economic Community, 25 INT'L LAW. 1, 2 (1991).
182. See generally Toll, supra note 113.
183. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, arts. 19(1), 20(1); see also Gru-
son & Nikowitz, supra note 131, at 211-12; Toll, supra note 113, at 624-26.
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thermore, the EC has addressed a major shortcoming of the
First Banking Directive, which only liberated the establish-
ment provisions for EC nationals, by now allowing both EC
members and non-EC members to utilize the "single passport"
to establish banking institutions throughout the EC simply by
acquiring a single license in one country." This version of
the "single passport" liberates cross-border financing and al-
lows the EC nations to become more interdependent while
integrating them into the global economy as well.
2. Country of Regulation
The Second Banking Directive's regulation scheme intro-
duces the concept of "home state" lawmaking. Article 13 pro-
vides that the laws of the member state in which the license is
established, i.e., the bank's home, will constitute the essential
regulations that govern the banking institution in all EC
states.'85 This version of the "home state" regulation differs
from that of the First Directive, which allowed host states to
fully regulate all the activities of a bank inside its borders. " '
Moreover, under the Second Directive, all member states must
now allow certain "core activities"'87 to be pursued in their
countries, even if their particular licenses do not authorize
them.8
8
Since one of the goals of the Second Directive was to curb
forum shopping,8 9 "home state" regulations had to prohibit
184. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, arts. 19(1), 20(1).
185. Id. art. 13(1); see also Kessler, supra note 9, at 401.
186. See First Banking Directive, supra note 123, art. 3.
187. The core activities are accepting deposits from the public, lending, finan-
cial leasing, money transmission services, issuing means of payment (credit cards,
traveler's checks, and banker's drafts), guarantees, trading for their own account or
for customer accounts (in money market instruments, foreign exchange, financial
futures and options, exchange and interest rate instruments, transferable securi-
ties), participating in share issues, advising on capital structures and industrial
strategy, money brokering, portfolio management and advice, safekeeping and ad-
ministration of securities, credit reference services, safe custody services, and con-
sumer, mortgage, or commercial credit transactions. See Second Banking Directive,
supra note 124, annex.
188. See discussion of the Annex of core activities which must be permitted in
every EC member state, even if the state opts to limit its license to certain activ-
ities, infra subpart IV.B.6.
189. See supra text accompanying note 129 discussing the forum shopping per-
mitted under the First Directive.
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banks from seeking out the least intrusive regulations by only
allowing a bank to take advantage of the core authorized activ-
ities list if that bank would be allowed to offer those banking
services in its own country.19 Thus, "home state" regulation
became the most important deterrent to forum shopping.
3. Minimum Standards
The Second Banking Directive, in combination with other
new banking directives,19' specifies minimum financial stan-
dards before an institution can be licensed to conduct banking
activity in the EC. Specifically, Article 10(1) of the Second
Banking Directive requires that all EC banks maintain mini-
mum capital reserves of five million ECUs.'92 Furthermore,
the Solvency Directive requires at least an eight percent sol-
vency ratio, defined by the Directive as the ratio of assets to
credit risks as a percentage, for all credit institutions who wish
190. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, recitals 4, 5. For example, in
country A, savings banks are not allowed to underwrite securities transactions, but
in country B there are no limitations on the scope of activities in which a banking
institution can engage. Bank A may receive its single EC banking license in coun-
try A which will enable it to provide services freely throughout the EC, however,
the license will be limited to activities which the bank would be able to engage in
at home (i.e., it will not include a license to underwrite securities transactions
even when it is doing business in the more liberal country B). However, a banking
institution licensed in country B will be able to underwrite securities transactions
even in the more strictly regulated country A with its single passport. Therefore,
so long as (1) the EC license permits the activity, (2) the bank's home state per-
mits the activity, and (3) the activity is on the list of acceptable activities in the
directive, the activity may be pursued freely anywhere in the market. Id. recitals
4, 5, annex I.
191. See supra note 138 discussing the "Own Funds" Directive, the Large Expo-
sure Directive, and the Solvency Directive.
192. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, art. 10(1). The ECU is the EC's
currency unit defined as a basket of the existing currencies, weighted according to
the importance of each currency and country in the community. Bank of England
Said to Oppose Hard ECU Revival, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Aug. 11, 1993,
available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, EURCOM File. Originally, the EC had
planned for the ECU to become the common currency of the entire common mar-
ket. Alan Riding, Europeans Accept a Single Currency and Bank by 1999, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 1991, at Al. See generally Treaty on European Union and Final
Act, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. However,
member state voting on the Maastricht Treaty has proven to be very difficult, and
most do not believe it will ever enter into force. Bank of England, supra; Summer
Storm a Foretaste of Worse to Come for EMS?, EUROPEAN INSIGHT, Sept. 3, 1993,
available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, INT File.
HUNGARIAN BANKING LAW
to be licensed in the EC.'93 The solvency ratio must be main-
tained at all times, under penalty of a bank losing its EC
authorization."' These provisions seek to inspire worldwide
confidence in all EC banks, regardless of their nationality.
4. Foreign Treatment
The Second Banking Directive requires that non-EC na-
tions offer EC banks reciprocal treatment.' 5 If read narrow-
ly, this would require all non-EC nations to model their bank-
ing regulations specifically after the EC to have mirror image
reciprocity.196 However, the requirement has recently been
given a less restrictive reading to mean that EC institutions
must be provided with "effective access" to the foreign market
on a non-discriminatory basis.'97 Still, if the Community de-
cides that an EC institution has not been granted non-discrim-
inatory treatment in a non-member country, the Community
may suspend, either temporarily or permanently, the licenses
of all of that country's national banks in the EC until negotia-
tions can ensure proper treatment for the EC banks
abroad.19
5. Ownership
Noticeably, there are no limitations on ownership in the
EC's banking directives.'99 This has generally been the case
throughout the EC because neither the First Directive, nor the
various national laws of the member states, limited in any way
the amount of ownership by foreign or domestic banks doing
193. Solvency Directive, supra note 138.
194. Id. The Directive states that by January 1, 1993, all credit institutions
shall be required permanently to maintain the ratio of at least eight percent. Id.
art. 10(1). Furthermore, if the ratio falls below eight percent, the competent au-
thorities may take over supervision of the bank until it returns to the require-
ment. Id. art. 10(3).
195. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, art. 9. Specifically, when an EC
bank gets a license to bank in a country, they expect to receive a license through-
out that country. Keith M. Rockwell, US Banking Laws May Draw EC Fire, J.
COM., Mar. 15, 1989, at 3A, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, JOC File.
196. Goldstein, supra note 110, at 228-29.
197. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, art. 9(3); Goldstein, supra note
110, at 228-29; Hymas, supra note 125, at 1687; Toll, supra note 113, at 626-28.
198. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, art. 9(4).
199. See infra text accompanying note 248.
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business in their countries."0 The EC has been fairly liberal
in its ownership laws, and because most EC economies are al-
ready competition based, there is no need to limit ownership to
increase competition between domestic and foreign banks.
6. Authorized Activities
Finally, the EC has very few prohibitions on the types of
banking activities which may be practiced throughout the
Community.20 ' The Annex to the Second Directive lists a
large non-exhaustive list of permitted banking activities in-
cluding the acceptance of deposits, lending, financial leasing,
the issuance of means of payment, trading in securities, foreign
exchange, and portfolio management. °2 All EC members
must permit foreign banks to engage in these activities within
their borders, but the Directive does allow home nation licens-
es to limit these activities of individual national banks.0 3
The Second Directive therefore authorizes universal bank-
ing,0 4 but does not require every country to offer the same li-
cense. Banks are authorized to engage in a particular activity
if. (1) the financial service to be provided is listed on the an-
nex, and 2) the home member license of that bank permits the
particular activity.
2 5
200. See First Banking Directive, supra note 123; Second Banking Directive,
supra note 124.
201. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, art. 18.
202. Id., annex.
203. Warner, supra note 134, at 14-15.
204. Worth, supra note 169, at 140 n.36; see supra note 26 (defining universal
banking).
205. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, recitals 4, 5. See also Gruson &
Nikowitz, supra note 131, at 214; Gruson & Fuering, supra note 181, at 4; Schnei-
der, supra note 115, at 271.
During the hearings regarding the single passport license, Manuel H. John-
son, the vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board testified that the goal of
these provisions was to create pressures within the Community for liberalization of
more restrictive regulations, which would in effect create a Community with one
standard for banking-the universal model. Oversight Hearings on EC 1992 Pro-
gram: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institution on Supervision,
Regulations, and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking and Urban Affairs,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7 (1988).
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C. Analysis
A comparative analysis of the Hungarian and EC banking
laws establishes that although the 1991 Hungarian law meets
some of the more basic regulations of Western style bank-
ing,"' many severe disincentives to foreign investment re-
main in the new Hungarian law.0 7 However, Hungary is not
alone among modern economies in that others also maintain
restrictive banking regulations.0 8 The purpose behind these
strict regulations is primarily to protect banks from exposure
to foreign dominance and overly exuberant risk takers.0 9 The
countries with restrictive banking systems responded with
dismay at the EC's banking industry liberalization because
they were concerned that the EC's provisions-especially the
Single Passport and universal banking provisions-would ei-
ther pressure non-EC countries to enact similar legislation, or
to forego their competitive presence in the newly liberalized
market.210 If the Hungarian banking law fails to address each
issue as did the Second Banking Directive, Hungarians may be
foreclosed from the EC market, and Hungary's foray into the
international community may be halted before it truly begins.
However, the Hungarian banks are still in their developing
stage and any additional economic pressure on them promises
only to make a bad economic situation worse.
206. See infra subpart IV.C.3 (minimum standards).
207. See infra subpart IV.C.1 (establishment); subpart IV.C.2 (country of regula-
tion); subpart I.C.4 (foreign treatment); subpart IV.C.5 (ownership limitations);
and subpart IV.C.6 (authorized activities).
208. For example, both the United States and Japan maintain tight control
over the activities of both nationally regulated banks and purely local financial
enterprises although even Japan is changing its restrictive nature. See generally
Peter J. Ferrara, The Regulatory Separation of Banking From Securities and Com-
merce in the Modern Financial Marketplace, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 583, 613 (1991).
209. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank
Risk, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1277, 1277 (1989); Don More, Note, The Virtues of Glass-
Steagall: An Argument Against Legislative Repeal, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 433,
433 (1991).
210. Toll, supra note 113, at 626. Toll argues that the United States has not
acted with much foresight in allowing the EC to lead the world in deregulation,
and he predicts that this will most likely lead to serious harm of United States
interests abroad. Id. at 617. Furthermore, other authors argue that "whatever
emerges [in the United States, it] must deal with the weaknesses in the current
system, and enable United States institutions to compete more effectively with
their foreign rivals." Boger, supra note 152, at 1003.
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Before comparing the actual banking provisions of the EC
and Hungary, it is critical to remember that the business and
political climates in the two countries are light years- apart.
Differing psychological philosophies and economic goals have
reigned for the last forty years, which make most of the differ-
ences at least understandable. While the EC has been banking
with the advanced ideals of the "single market"21' and "Free-
dom of Establishment,"212 Hungary has been struggling to
gain merely small victories in the privatization of its mar-
ket"' and the restructuring of its banking system.1 4 Fur-
thermore, while the EC members have been players in the
international marketplace of competitive banking, Hungary
remains almost paralyzed by its fear of foreign economic and
political domination." 5 Finally, the EC is a world economic
superpower, while Hungary fights to escape the remnants of
an underdeveloped command economy. Thus, the financial
growth of Hungarian banking will be advanced only through
conservative fiscal policies and economic stability. Therefore,
although Hungary is in grave need of foreign investment to aid
in the transition to a market economy, she cannot tolerate too
violent a change. Furthermore, because Hungarians are still
mentally opposed to any foreign involvement in their economy,
the laws have remained quite nationalistic to protect them-
selves from the evils of foreign involvement in their economy.
1. Establishment
One way in which the banking provisions in Hungary and
in the EC differ lies in the ease by which a bank can establish
a new branch. The establishment requirements in Hungary are
much more restrictive than the corresponding provisions under
211. Wegen, supra note 4, at S99.
212. EEC TREATY, art. 52.
213. See Ash, supra note 96; Patience, supra note 96; Sloan, supra note 19, at
78. For example, Sony Music Entertainment had been working in Hungary since
the mid-1980s with a formerly state-owned monopoly through a licensing agree-
ment. In March of 1993, Sony was finally able to privatize and incorporate fully
in Hungary. This is a very small step, which hopes to pave the way for further
foreign investment in the entertainment and music field, but it took over eight
years to accomplish. See Kasriel, supra note 96.
214. Hungary's New Banking Law, supra note 8; Riding the Tiger, supra note
8.
215. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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the EC regulations. In Hungary, the establishment of banks
has been greatly liberated by Article 15, because for the first
time a fully foreign bank can be established with little or no
involvement of the NBH.21 s However, if any bank (foreign or
domestic) wants to set up a branch office in another part of
Hungary, the bank must start from scratch and it cannot just
use the first authorization to bank freely throughout the coun-
try.21 By contrast, the EC's Second Banking Directive liber-
ates banking not only in individual countries,21 but through-
out the entire EC. By authorizing member states to grant, and
banks to receive, a single license in one of twelve countries, the
Directive permits free expansion throughout the Community
without any additional requirements.219
Establishing a bank in Hungary is a long bureaucratic
process which must be endured each time a new banking insti-
tution is put in place, regardless of whether it is a branch
office or a new incorporated office. This highly burdensome
process obviously discourages foreign investors looking to open
banks abroad from investing in the Hungarian banking mar-
ket. Comparatively, the ease of establishment available in the
EC has been not only a competitive advantage for EC banks,
but may also have caused EC banks to be hesitant to establish
institutions in more restrictive systems.2 The EC views such
limited establishment rights as characteristic of more restric-
216. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 15(1), translat-
ed in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1791-92.
217. Id. arts. 82-85, translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1829.
218. This was the effect of the First Banking Directive, supra note 123, arts.
3(2)-3(3). See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text discussing the establish-
ment clause in the First Banking Directive.
219. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, arts. 19(1), 20(1).
220. The United States is an example of a more restrictive banking system.
Specifically, the United States has a dual system of banking regulation, whereby
nationally chartered banks are regulated by federal laws, and state chartered
banks are regulated by state laws and certain uniform national laws. See generally
Wilmarth, supra note 151, at 969-77. Once a bank is established, the McFadden
Act, ch. 191 § 7, 44 Stat. 1228 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36
(1988)), and the Douglas Amendment, ch. 240 § 3(d), 70 Stat. 134 (1956) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988)), limit the ability of that bank to
branch within the state or outside of that state by subjecting it to the provisions
of the home state's laws. See Wilmarth, supra note 151, at 975-77. When an EC
bank tries to branch throughout the United States, it is slowed to a halt with the
extra legislation, which may have reduced the number of EC bank establishments
in the United States.
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tive banking systems, like Hungary's, as a competitive barrier
for its banks abroad, and a great disincentive for EC banks
looking to expand globally."' The EC also asserts that it is
unjust for foreign banks to come to Europe and expect the
expansive establishment rights without the existence of similar
incentives for EC banks abroad. 2 Thus, because Hungary's
limited establishment rights will substantially discourage EC
investment in the Hungarian banking industry, the establish-
ment provisions fail to meet one of the main goals of the 1991
law.
Arguably, the reluctance of EC banks to invest in Hungary
may be due to Hungary's lack of market-oriented incentives
characteristic of more financially stable countries rather than
its restrictive. bank establishment rights. After all, on occasion,
restrictive banking regulations in other nations have not in
fact discouraged foreign investment in these countries. 3
However, there is no impetus for foreign banks to overcome the
restrictive regulations in Hungary because there are very few
foreign companies in Hungary who need financial backing from
their home nation's banks. Furthermore, foreign banks would
probably be viewed with suspicion by Hungarian business
owners who are likely to deny a foreign bank Hungarian busi-
ness in favor of a national bank. Moreover, Hungary is barely
a competitive economy, and cannot begin to compete with the
221. Toll, supra note 113, at 630-31.
For example, some in the United States fear that EC banks looking to
branch out internationally will not want to establish in the United States due to
the overly restrictive regulations. Boger, supra note 152, at 1021. Furthermore, the
more liberal regulations of foreign banks have placed the United States banking
industry at a competitive disadvantage. Wilmarth, supra note 151, at 964. As a
result of this, many United States local and state governments have been reducing
their regulations to permit more interstate banking because they recognize that
the increased pressure from international banks is slowly reducing the competitive
edge United States banks used to have over the world market. Id. Many have
argued that if the United States hopes to survive the international trend, it will
have to deregulate and consolidate its banks to compete with international banks.
Id. at 964-67.
222. Hymas, supra note 125, at 1701-03.
223. Nobody claims that the United States has discouraged international bank-
ing by any means despite its restrictive banking systems. For example, Credit
Lyonnais (a French bank) is actively involved in not only banking in the United
States, but in business and commercial mergers as well, showing that strict regu-
lations did not act as a disincentive to keep this large and internationally impor-
tant foreign bank out of the United States. See Meredith Fisher, Upheaval at
MGM, WASH. POST, July 26, 1993, at B3.
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economic superpowers around the world, and banks have no
real need to establish themselves in Hungary. The forces which
encourage foreign banks to overcome the restrictions of other
restrictive regulatory situations do not exist in Hungary, and
therefore the overly restrictive establishment regulation of the
Hungarian banking law will discourage foreign investment in
the Hungarian banking market, slowing rather than acceler-
ating Hungary's acceptance into the EC market.
2. Country of Regulation
Another factor considered by bankers when seeking to
invest in a new country is the choice of law provisions of the
host state. In Hungary, all banks, foreign or domestic, are
governed by Hungarian law, and are thereby limited to the
listed activities of Article 33.224 This provision is similar to
the approach of the EC's First Banking Directive which al-
lowed the law of the host state to supersede the laws of the
bank's home state, thereby limiting banks to what the host
state permitted.22 5 By contrast, the Second Directive adopts
the "home state" control approach, whereby the law of the
licensing or home state remains the law of the bank
throughout the EC. 6
Because the host state control in Hungary turns regulation
over to the national government of Hungary, the choice-of-law
provision in the Hungarian banking law is likely to have an
anticompetitive effect on the banking industry, despite the
stated goals of the 1991 Law. While it was hoped the law
224. Act No. LXX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 83, translated
in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1829.
225. First Banking Directive, supra note 123, art. 4.
226. See supra note 190 for the example given. In this case, a German bank
will be able to perform its universal banking with its German-EC license freely
throughout the EC, even throughout Greece, whose banks are limited to certain
listed activities. However, a Greek bank's Greek-EC license will limit it to certain
specified activities, even in the very liberal Germany.
227. Like Hungary, the United States banking regulations rely on "host" state
control. Boger, supra note 152, at 1013. This gives regulatory power over foreign
banks to the state of location, and to the United States federal government.
Therefore, since the laws of each state are different, a bank trying to expand
throughout the United States has to have different bank procedures in every sin-
gle state. Because of this, the United States Congress has tried for the last few
years to curtail the power of the individual states over banks in their municipali-
ties because of the hindering affect it has on interstate competition for both for-
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would encourage foreign investment, the law will likely dis-
courage it by subjecting all banks to Hungarian regulation,
and leaving very little discretion to the home state. Over-regu-
lation in a national banking policy like Hungary's is being
questioned internationally by foreign banks, businesses, and
governments. Hungary may be well advised to allow home
state control to invite free market banking instead of central
regulation. Again, when banks are looking to expand globally,
they will not choose an overly regulated market, especially
when they can choose from liberal banking laws at home or in
other liberated systems."2
3. Minimum Standards
Surprisingly, Hungary and the EC have two similar stan-
dards in their banking regulations. The minimum capitaliza-
tion and solvency standards required for bank authorization in
the two regulations mirror one another. Both the EC and Hun-
gary require that a certain amount of paid-in capital accompa-
ny a bank application, and that these sums of money remain in
the bank's reserves at all times.229 Furthermore, both the EC
and Hungary require that the solvency ratio of all banks be
maintained at eight percent." The purpose of these mini-
mum required standards is primarily to serve as a cushion or
insurance fund to absorb any losses that may occur.23' There-
fore, both the EC and Hungary appear to have realized that in
order to inspire confidence in their banking institutions on the
part of depositors and to actually protect its investors, banks
must maintain minimum amounts of available cash at all times." 2
eign and domestic banks. Id. In fact, large United States banks are faced with
deteriorating market shares at home as a result of both domestic and internation-
al competitors, and many argue that if the states had less regulatory power, the
banks would be able to cross state borders, consolidate their activities to become
more efficient, and would be much better off competitively. Id. at 1024; see also
Wilmarth, supra note 151, at 1004-05.
228. See supra note 153 for a discussion of the race to the bottom.
229. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 8(4)(a), trans-
lated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1788; Second Banking Directive,
supra note 124, art. 10(1).
230. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 23(1), translat-
ed in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1797; Solvency Directive, supra note
138.
231. Alford, supra note 167, at 191.
232. Alford, supra note 167. In addition to these protections, in order to en-
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Interestingly, the levels of capitalization required by the
new Hungarian law are precisely those levels which are re-
quired not only by the EC, but also by various international
organizations. This development in Hungary reflects Hungary's
intent to meet world-wide standards for the first time.233 The
ability of Hungary's banks to meet these EC standards imme-
diately will likely encourage further negotiations regarding
Hungary's associate member status in the EC. Moreover, these
provisions display the Hungarian government's active policy in
favor of maintaining conservative, stable banks and enabling
free competition without government intervention. The higher
levels of capitalization ensure consumer confidence without
requiring government protection, and are likely to increase
foreign interest in investing in Hungary, without the fear of a
reversion to government subsidization.
4. Foreign Treatment
The Hungarian banking law does not offer national treat-
ment for foreigners attempting to invest in the financial servic-
es market in Hungary.234 By contrast, the EC's Second Bank-
ing Directive applies non-discriminatorily to both EC and non-
EC members, thereby offering national treatment to foreigners
in the EC."3S Furthermore, Hungary merely requires its
banks to be treated to national treatment by foreign laws,
while the EC's Second Banking Directive states that technical-
ly, the EC will demand "reciprocal" treatment (requiring the
application of laws equivalent to the EC's Second Banking
courage foreign investment in Hungarian banks, Hungary recently passed a new
law which protects foreign currency on deposit in Hungarian banks as equally as
it does Hungarian forints. Hungary: Legislation on Protecting of Bank Deposits,
BBC MONITORING SERVICE-E. EUROPE, July 8, 1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-
NEWS-C File.
233. The standards are being set for banks by the Basle Committee, which is
comprised of banks and supervisory authorities of the most advanced economic
powers in the world, including Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. See
Worth, supra note 169, at 134 n.2. The Basle Committee sets international bank
standards primarily in response to the inter-dependence of the world economy and
the need for common standards to ensure financial protections across the globe.
See generally id.
234. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, arts. 15(3)-(4),
18(1), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1792, 1794.
235. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, arts. 8-9.
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Directive) for its banks abroad. 6 In other words, EC banks
expect to receive all the benefits of the EC banking law when
they open offices abroad, and if they do not, the Community
has the authority to refuse to authorize the establishment of
that nation's foreign bank offices in the EC. Hungary only
expects its nationals to be granted the same treatment by a
foreign government as nationals of that foreign country.237
Clearly, Hungary and the EC differ in their positions on
foreign treatment. Hungary may claim that the EC's reciproci-
ty requirement constitutes a "club in the closet,"23 8 forcing
Hungary's more restrictive banking regulations to conform
with the EC's by threatening foreclosure from the EC market.
Moreover, EC member states may be angry that Hungary will
be permitted to become a "free rider" by enjoying the liberal
access provisions in the EC while severely restricting access to
the Hungarian banking market for EC investors.3 9
236. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 15(4)(d), trans-
lated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1792. Hungary expects its banks
locating abroad to be subject to either Hungarian law provisions or the national
laws of that country despite the fact that Hungary discriminates against foreign-
ers. Cf Second Banking Directive, supra note 124. EC banks wish to operate un-
der the elements of the arguably liberal Second Banking Directive, even when
they are banking in the more restrictive United States or Hungary.
237. Act No. LXIX on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 15(4)(d), translated in 2
Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1792.
238. Like Hungary, United States banks only require "national" treatment for
their banks abroad, and only offer it to foreign banks in the United States. Hy-
mas, supra note 125, at 1694. Foreign banks are treated to the same over-regula-
tion with which United States banks must contend. When the EC's reciprocity
requirement was first announced, United States bankers called the reciprocity re-
quirement "a club in the closet" allowing the EC to force the United States to
change its banking regulations to mirror the EC's regulations, or risk losing per-
mission to bank in the EC. Id.; see also Goldstein, supra note 110, at 190 (dis-
cussing the United States fears that reciprocity would cause the United States to
lose all international opportunities in the EC); see infra note 239 (discussing of the
compromise settlement which the United States gained from the EC, again with-
out changing any United States legislation).
239. During the United States-EC controversy, the EC was angry that the
United States felt they had a right to complain since, as written, the Directive
allowed the United States to be a "free rider," with United States banks reaping
all the benefits of the EC's laws without giving any concessions in return. Many
benefits of financial integration in the EC were soon to be granted to United
States banks without any corresponding benefit in the United States' highly re-
strictive banking market. Hymas, supra note 125, at 1703. This controversy and
anger over the reciprocity provision was so strong that EC leaders revised the
requirement "in response to international criticism" to mean that non-discriminato-
ry national treatment would be considered valid foreign treatment. Id. at 1693;
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Because of this disparity of treatment, it is likely that
Hungarian banks will be denied EC licenses until and unless
the Hungarian law at least offers non-discriminatory national
treatment. For example, a non-Hungarian who wishes to estab-
lish a bank in Hungary must fulfill eight separate criteria
which must be reviewed by the NBH and the BSB,24 while a
Hungarian national is presumed to have fulfilled the require-
ments, and will be authorized upon the mere notification of the
BSB.24' Furthermore, a Hungarian may purchase up to twen-
ty-five percent of any banking institution without question,242
while a foreigner is subject to scrutiny at a ten percent pur-
chase level.24 This policy again most likely emanates from
the severe xenophobia on the part of Hungarians, which causes
them to set up ethnic and national barriers around all types of
commercial laws.244
These discriminatory provisions discourage foreign invest-
ment in Hungary because foreigners are not afforded the same
treatment as Hungarian nationals, and therefore, "national
treatment" is not fulfilled. Furthermore, it is very likely that
the EC could impose the higher reciprocity standard in its
evaluation of Hungary in retaliation for its .discriminatory
practices.245 The favorable economic and political conditions
Rockwell, supra note 195. EC officials wanted to be certain that United States
banks did not get too angry at their perceived problems with the Directive, be-
cause the EC "has everything to gain from a real single market in financial ser-
vices that is open to the world." Keith M. Rockwell, EC Banking Market to be
Open to World Commissioner Says, J. COM., May 1, 1989, at 7A, available in LEX-
IS, NEXIS Library, JOC File. Thus, the EC does not intend to close the doors to
foreign banks unless there is discrimination in the foreign markets. Id. This
means that any nation which treats foreign banks the same as its national banks
shall receive EC benefits. Hymas, supra note 125, at 1693-94.
240. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 15(3)-(4), trans-
lated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1792.
241. The only limitations to a Hungarian is that he or she have no police
record, have a college degree, and have some management experience. Act No.
LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, arts. 12-14, translated in 2 Hungar-
ian Rules of Law in Force at 1790-1791.
242. Id. art. 18(1), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Forece at 1794.
243. Id. art. 15(1), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1791-
1792.
244. See supra note 19.
245. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, art. 9(4). See generally Gruson
& Nikowitz, supra note 131, at 229-40 (discussing the various applications of the
reciprocity requirement); Toll, supra note 113, at 626-27. The test is probably a
flexible one, but it has retained some bite for discriminatory practices. Goldstein,
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which encourage the EC to be more lenient on some other
legislatively restrictive nations do not exist in the Hungarian
situation. The Hungarian market desperately needs an infu-
sion of advanced systems and European support, while the EC
will lose nothing from foregoing the new banking opportunities
in Hungary. The EC has nothing to gain by being lenient on
Hungary, while Hungary has everything to gain by being open
to the EC-it gains market access now, and earlier member-
ship status in the future. Hungary's failure to offer national
treatment will therefore slow full membership talks with the
EC and will discourage foreign investment in Hungary.
5. Ownership
An additional distinction between the banking law in Hun-
gary and that of the EC lies in their ownership requirements.
The new Hungarian banking law provides strict limitations on
the ownership of banks. Specifically, no one party, foreign or
domestic, can own more than twenty-five percent of the out-
standing capital in a Hungarian bank, unless that party is
another banking institution.246 Furthermore, if a foreigner
tries to acquire more than ten percent of a Hungarian bank,
the foreigner must seek the permission of the BSB.247 In
stark contrast, the EC has placed no limitations on the per-
centages which can be owned by any one party in any type of
bank.24
8
The primary reason for the Hungarian limitation is to
advance the privatization and decentralization of the banking
system.249 Before 1987, all of the banks in Hungary were
owned and operated by the government. The overly cen-
tralized power base has not only slowed the reform efforts,25'
but has probably allowed a certain amount of centralized plan-
ning to remain in the banking system. 2 In order to cut down
supra note 110, at 229-30; Rockwell, supra note 239, at 7A.
246. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 18(1), translat-
ed in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1794.
247. Id. art. 15(5), translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1792.
248. See generally supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
249. Lock et al., supra note 8.
250. See supra note 93.
251. See Hall, supra note 155, at 221.
252. For example, in France where the banks are undergoing continuous dereg-
ulation and denationalization, the government acknowledges its continuing power
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on the NBH's power to encourage further decentralization and
further reforms, the 1991 law makes it illegal to own above a
specified amount of a Hungarian bank."' By contrast, be-
cause most of the European banking systems have been pri-
marily competitive-based and historically privately-owned, they
do not need decentralization laws or ownership caps. 4 On
the other hand, those EC members who are still in the process
of deregulating their purely government-controlled economies
are expected to suffer greatly in the advent of the single bank-
ing market."'
The Hungarian ownership limitations will encourage for-
eign investment in the banking sector, but not as much as the
Hungarian legislature may have hoped. It will encourage for-
eigners to invest in Hungary because many shares of Hungari-
an banks will go on sale on the international market for the
first time. However, at the same time, it will discourage invest-
ment, because foreign parties who wish to invest will want to
do so from a position of power. If a party is limited to purchas-
ing ten to twenty-five percent of a bank, it will have less power
to control the actions of that bank. Furthermore, it may be
seen that by limiting ownership, Hungary is limiting the abili-
ty of foreigners with banking experience from effectively
changing the course of a bank. Thus, under the new Hungari-
an regulations, the foreigner will not invest given the minimal
opportunity to control banks from a small ownership position
with relatively little power.
6. Authorized Activities
The last critical difference between the Second Banking
Directive and the new Hungarian banking law is the list of
authorized activities permitted under each regulation. Hungary
to pressure private banks' activity by setting interest rates and monetary policy
according to the government goals. Id. at 210-11.
253. As of October 20, 1993, the NBH has conformed with this provision in all
but one bank, and now owns twenty-five percent or less of all the banks. Govern-
ment to Discuss Proposals on Central Bank, MTI ECONONEWS, Oct. 20, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, MTI File.
254. Kessler, supra note 9, at 414-17 (explaining weakness of former govern-
ment owned institutions as compared with competitive banks).
255. See supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text (discussing the current
problems for the historically overly regulated and government owned Spanish,
French, Italian, Portuguese and Greek banks).
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only allows banks, foreign or domestic, to engage in very basic
financial services,"' and absolutely forbids its banks to en-
gage in investment, insurance, or securities activities.57 By
stark contrast, the EC Second Banking Directive permits uni-
versal banking,258 meaning that almost any activity involving
the supply, control, or use of financing is valid so long as the
license received by the home state permits it." 9 Article 33 of
Hungary's 1991 law is similar to article 4 of the EC's First
Banking Directive which did not mutually recognize banking
licenses and thereby limited the banking activities which could
be practiced in that nation, regardless of what the bank's home
state laws allowed.26 °
The decentralization of money and expertise under limited
two-tiered systems such as Hungary's create several problems
such as increased inefficiencies in the home market as well as
decreased competitive advantages in foreign markets."1 Fur-
256. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 4, translated in
2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1783-1785.
257. Id. art. 33, translated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1801-
1802. This description is generally known as the dual-tierred system, forbidding
the commingling of commercial and investment banking. More, supra note 209, at
434.
258. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, art. 18, annex; see supra note
26 for a definition of universal banking.
259. For example, if bank A gets a license in Greece, it will not be permitted
to engage in insurance underwriting, even when it opens a branch office in Ger-
many. However, bank B's German license will be mutually recognized by even the
Greek authorities, and will thereby permit insurance underwriting in Greece.
260. First Banking Directive, supra note 123, art. 4. Both the First Banking
Directive and the Hungarian methods limit the activities to the law of the host
state. Bank B, a German bank located in Hungary (see supra note 259), will not
be permitted to engage in insurance underwriting, just as it would have been
forbidden from doing in Greece under the First Banking Directive.
261. This problem has been addressed recently in the analysis of the United
States system, which is very similar to the current Hungarian system. Specifically
the Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 66, 48 Stat. 162 (1937) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C.), completely separates the functions of commercial
banking from investment banking activities, and limits the activities in which
either type of bank can engage. For example, in the United States, any bank
authorized to take deposits cannot engage in or be affiliated with an institution
which provides investment banking, and vice versa. Some have described the dif-
ference between* universal banking and the more limited system as the difference
between "buying a car and buying the parts separately to build the car." Boger,
supra note 152, at 1024 (citing SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, FINANCE
AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON TASK FORCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETI-
TIVENESS OF U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 291-95 (Comm.
Print 1990)). Furthermore, it is generally agreed that the distinction "inhibits
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thermore, limited systems do not allow banks to "diversify in
the face of reduced profits," and therefore the severe regulation
forces banks to take increased risks to try to maintain a prof-
it.262 Many believe in viewing how the EC has gone almost
exclusively to the universal system, that any country which
fails to authorize universal banking "risk[s] irreparable harm
to its own institutions."263
However, some commentators point out that while univer-
sal banking can be very effective in highly developed nations,
it can be disastrous to less developed economies.2" The fear
is that by allowing banks to engage in both commercial and in-
foreign competition without serving a valid domestic purpose" in the United States
because the United States already has a competitive advantage in the trade of
services, and has no need to protect its banking industry. Hymas, supra note 125,
at 1688. It has traditionally been stated that the limitations in the United States
banking field have put United States banks at a tremendous disadvantage when
foreign corporations go looking in the United States for the same type of financial
services that they can get overseas. Boger, supra note 152, at 1024.
262. Toll, supra note 113, at 633. In 1991, Mexico enacted a universal banking
law which many believe will allow "Mexico's financial system . . . [to] . . . operate
more efficiently since financial institutions . . . [will be] . . . able to maximize
economies of scale and scope, enter new markets, exploit synergies, and explore
new growth and cross-marketing opportunities." Bronwen Davis, Comment, Mexico's
Commercial Banking Industry: Can Mexico's Recently Privatized Banks Compete
with the United States Banking Industry After Enactment of the North American
Free Trade Agreement? 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 77, 108 (1993).
263. Toll, supra note 113, at 635. The trend toward universal banking is ex-
pected to continue due to the competitive advantage this type of system offers for
less restricted banks. Schneider, supra note 115, at 280. It has been stated "while
the international community is playing soccer, we [the United States] continue to
play United States football." Marylin B. Cane, The Eagle or the Ostrich: A United
States Perspective on the Future of Transnational Banking, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 183, 183 (1992). The United States Congress probably realizes this, and instead
of repealing the law, every year, more loopholes in Glass-Steagall are found, allow-
ing banks to do today what was unimaginable ten years ago. Id. at 200-01. Some
commentators even argue that United States banks may not be contemplating
significant expansion into the global market because in order to do so, the United
States Congress must get rid of Glass-Steagall. Toll, supra note 113, at 640-41.
Unless the United States Congress does repeal the restrictive laws, it cannot hope
to see its banks maintain their current market share, especially in Europe. Id. at
642.
Even lesser developed economies are joining the banking trend of allowing
universal banking. See Davis, supra note 262, at 107-08. Davis argues that
Mexico's foray into the universal banking system will encourage more foreign in-
vestment in their banks, particularly in the commercial banking industry despite
the considerable protection Mexican banks still receive. Id. at 107-08.
264. Interview with Roberta Karmel, Professor at Brooklyn Law School and
Former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, at Brooklyn
Law School, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Jan. 27, 1994) [hereinafter Karmel Interview].
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vestment transactions, banks will gain control over the entire
securities market.265 Instead of creating an efficient competi-
tive pricing market, allowing banks to engage in securities
trading establishes a market which is centrally controlled by
the large banks, creating a situation where one small fiscal
mistake can become nationally disastrous."' Furthermore,
allowing banks to engage in significant securities activities
may place the deposits at substantial risk at a time when the
economy's lesser developed banking industry needs to be en-
couraging stability and conservative lending decisions.267
These commentators argue that any mass deregulation in the
banking industry, to keep up with the less restrictive banking
systems... in an economy in transition, may therefore be very
dangerous to the developing economy. Overextended bank
capital and significant risk to deposits and investments may in
turn lead to failed banks and government intervention.269
Thus, it may well be that Hungary's choice to defer universal
banking was quite prudent in light of its need for economic
and fiscal stability.
Still, Hungary currently hopes to speed up its acceptance
into the EC, but cannot expect to be admitted while retaining
such strict limitations on banking activities. 70 Furthermore,
265. Id.; see also More, supra note 209, at 441-42 (describing the pre-Glass-
Steagall situation in the United States whereby the commercial banks dominated
the securities markets and exposed themselves to inordinate amounts of risk, caus-
ing not only the 1929 stock market crash, but also too many bank failures to
count).
266. Karmel Interview, supra note 264. When the United States was passing
the Glass-Steagall Act, one of the most often mentioned reasons was that "the
commercial banks shouldered a large share of the responsibility for the Depression
because of the[ir] speculative securities activities." Macey, supra note 209, at 1291.
267. Id. at 1277. "The leading edge issue in banking law today is-or ought to
be-bank risk. Every issue in banking law, whether it be bank failure policy,
entry restrictions, geographic restrictions, . . . restrictions on the scope of bank ac-
tivities, minimum capital requirements, or lending limits, was, at least ostensibly,
promulgated in order to mitigate the problem of excessive risk-taking by banks." Id.
at 1277 (emphasis added).
268. The race to the bottom theory is discussed at supra note 153.
269. Schneider, supra note 115, at 287. In fact, the three stated purposes for
the limited two-tiered system (like Hungary's and the United States') are consumer
protection, efficient credit distribution on a macroeconomic level, and effective
monetary policy. Emeric Fischer, Banking and Insurance-Should Ever the Twain
Meet?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 739, 744 (1992).
270. See generally Visegrad, supra note 5; see also French Foreign Minister
Backs Hungary's EC Membership Bid During Budapest Visit, BBC MONITORING
SERVICE--E. EUROPE, June 15, 1993, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS-C File;
[Vol. XX:3
HUNGARIAN BANIUNG LAW
Hungary is trying to encourage foreigners with more compet-
itive banking experience to infuse the Hungarian economy with
market-based capital banking experience. Many commentators
no longer agree that the limited system will actually protect
consumers from bank failures, and that by limiting the banks
options, the government leaves the bank open to reduced effi-
ciency, and unable to counteract the effects of economic down-
turns.2 1' By limiting the activities in which banks can en-
gage, Hungary's 1991 law encourages banks with efficient
universal systems to go elsewhere rather than risk the ineffi-
cient use of their knowledge and capital base in Hungary.
Finally, if Hungary hopes to compete in Europe, she may have
to offer the one-stop banking of the universal model, because
she does not have the broad-based pre-existing market that
other banks in the global field already have.
Hungary probably recognizes these negative attributes to
restrictive banking, yet chose the limited system rather than
the universal system in order to give Hungarian banks a
chance to catch up to the high international banking stan-
dards. Universal banking could result in adverse effects in
Hungary. For example, universal banking could spread the
limited capital base and banking experience over too many
activities. Thus, banks would likely overextend themselves in
an effort to offer every conceivable service to their customers.
Moreover, under universal banking, Hungarian banks would
be more inclined to utilize the stock market and thereby place
depositor's investments in grave risk instead of focusing on
prudent and conservative investments. By limiting authorized
activities, Hungary is enforcing the conservative view that in
order for Hungary's banking system to be successful, the banks
need to be slowly acclimated to the competitive system to avoid
the problems of inefficient diversity, inefficient funding, and
inefficient management which could come with a dramatic
shift to universal banking.Y7 2 Hungarian banks should be-
Nisbet, supra note 95, at 1.
271. More, supra note 209, at 466. Several studies show that the 1929 United
States stock market crash was not caused by banks engaging in securities activi-
ties. "[M]ost of these failures were due to structural weaknesses in the banking
system, notably the prohibition of nationwide banking and a restrictive monetary
policy." Id. at 440-41.
272. Helen A. Garten, Subtle Hazards, Financial Risks, and Diversified Banks:
An Essay on the Perils of Regulatory Reform, 49 MD. L. REV. 314 (1990). Note
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come strong in basic banking activities first, and gradually be
exposed to the more advanced forms of universal banking.
V. OBSERVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Hungary unquestionably needs foreign investment in its
banks to ensure the future success of its banking system. The
economy at large and the financial industry have both recently
stagnated in Hungary's slow forward progress into a true Wes-
tern-style system. The bureaucrats in charge of this privatiza-
tion process have no experience in the competitive banking
model, and only know of the antiquated and inefficient Soviet
model. Thus, any time the economic bureaucracy institutes a
necessary reform, they speak of it as a radical alteration; how-
ever, in reality it is merely a necessary step to allow Hungary
to catch up with the rest of the world. Moreover, Hungary is
completely dependent on the international trade market for
most of its primary products, and cannot merely shut its bor-
ders to foreign companies and banks."3 If Hungary's banking
system were friendlier to foreign banks, the increased
westernization would make foreign companies feel more com-
fortable trading goods and services in Hungary, and encourage
them to make farther investments in the Hungarian economy.
While Hungary appears cognizant of its need for foreign
investment in the banking industry, there are several factors
which continue to hinder its complete integration into the
international community. Primarily, Hungary is being held
back by its historically based paralyzing fear of foreign involve-
ment in the economy. The banking law has thus remained very
nationalistic, with discriminatory provisions to protect national
banks while disadvantaging foreign banks." 4 Although some
of the recent liberalizations open the doors to foreign involve-
ment on a large scale for the first time, the reforms place for-
eign investments under strict ownership limitations and re-
quire foreigners to meet higher criteria after extensive review
processes.275 This provision alone places Hungary well below
that Rusznak of the state banks said that all the EC rules cannot be adopted at
once, but that eventually Hungarian banks will go to universal banking. Hungary's
New Banking Law, supra note 8.
273. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
275. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, arts. 15, 18, trans-
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the establishment provisions of the Second Banking Direc-
tive."6 However, Hungary's psychological reluctance can be
understood by remembering that until recently, the NBH was
the almost exclusive source of authority in the Hungarian
banking industry, and is now decentralizing in favor of foreign-
ers for the first time."' The infusion of foreign investment in
the banking industry will have to therefore take some time as
Hungary actively overcomes its xenophobia.
Another factor hindering Hungary's economic transforma-
tion is time. It has taken the EC, an advanced economic orga-
nization, over forty years to drop their barriers and become a
truly common market, yet Hungary has been expected to
change its entire economic structure in six short years of eco-
nomic crisis. It is extremely time consuming to transform a
traditional Soviet-type economy into an efficiently operating
market economy due to the lack of competitive spirit which
Western economies prosper under.7 8 If such transformation
is to take place, the process will take decades to complete, even
if economic conditions are perfect. 9 Since 1987, Hungary has
dismantled a command economy monobank, set the commercial
and retail banks free, required bank profitability, made steps
toward technological advancements, and written laws which
are modelled exactly after the EC's banking provisions and
Western standards. In fact, the non-Hungarian discrimination
provisions in Hungary's banking law strictly mirror the provi-
sions of the First Banking Directive.28 ° Furthermore, Hunga-
ry has, by limiting foreign banks by Hungarian laws, done
exactly what the EC's First Banking Directive did by limiting
the scope of banking by the governance of the host state's
banking law.28' It seems, therefore, that Hungary deserves
lated in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1791-1793, 1794.
276. Second Banking Directive, supra note 124, arts. 8-9.
277. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 43 describing the Soviet-type economy which completely
removes any profit seeking orientation from the running of a business. Competitive
forces have not existed in Hungary for over forty years, thus not only does the
government have to create competition, but the government must also teach its
citizens how to work and profit in the competitive marketplace.
279. Marer, supra note 56, at 69.
280. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 83, translated
in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1829; First Banking Directive, supra
note 123, art. 4.
281. Act No. LXIX of 1991 on Banks and Banking Activity, art. 83, translated
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the same twenty years to advance to the EC level that it took
the EC to make the necessary modifications to the First Bank-
ing Directive.282
One major question remaining is why the Hungarian Leg-
islature did not merely return to the universal model effective-
ly used in the early nineteenth century.283 The answer is two-
fold; psychological avoidance, and economic impossibility. First,
an examination of the psychological underpinnings of the Sovi-
et-type economy displays how difficult it is for any reforms to
actually take place. Hungary was under the Soviet regime for
over two decades, and for the next two decades she was trying
to remember how to maintain a truly market based economy.
Now, Hungary is asked to totally reform not only its banking
system and its economy, but its entire way of life. Moreover,
one of the major difficulties of reform is that it must adversely
affect the interests of the political bureaucracy, which derives
substantial benefits from the administration and control of the
economy. However, this same bureaucracy is required to do
much of the work in implementing the reform and thus is
being expected to cooperate in its own extinction." This in-
herent conflict in goals among the bureaucrats of the NBH
makes it much easier to understand why the reforms take so
long, and appear to be in such small steps.
Secondly, even if Hungary's Parliament wanted to return
to universal banking in 1991, the economy was probably not
stable enough or staffed adequately enough with Western
trained bankers to return to that system, in light of the anti-
competitive structure that it had been subjected to for over
forty years under the Soviet system. It may be that Hungary
could not risk offering such advancements as universal bank-
ing at this early stage. Hungary realized that if establishment
and consolidation were made too easy, Hungarian banks could
have become too large and inefficient.285 Once the bank be-
in 2 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force at 1829; First Banking Directive, supra
note 123, art. 4.
282. For example, Hungary was able to meet the capitalization and adequacy
standards because they have been around longer than any other EC banking laws.
283. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
284. Roger A. Clarke, Reform of Soviet-Type Economies: Lessons of Hungarian
Experience, in SECOND DECADE OF ECONOMIC REFORM-PERSPECTIVES ON EASTERN
EUROPE, supra note 56, at 167.
285. Wilmarth, supra note 151, at 994-97.
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comes "too big to fail," the Hungarian government will be
forced to rescue it despite its inefficiencies and poor customer
service."' What Hungary needs now is profit-seeking efficient
banks, willing to work within the new competitive system, and
capable of growing to accommodate universal banking gradual-
ly over time. The Hungarian economy cannot tolerate the hav-
oc that would occur if the banks failed, and thus must remain
conservative in the continuing transition to a fully market
based economy.287
Moreover, Hungary is not yet a member of the EC, and
universal banking may be better suited for a harmonized qua-
si-governmental system than for a single economy in transi-
tion. The EC must accommodate the wishes of each nation,
because the country which feels slighted can block the adoption
of the directive in its entirety."' In order to accommodate all
twelve member states, the universal system authorizes all
banking activities, without requiring anything specific. Howev-
er, the economy of Hungary is not ready for so many choices,
and thus, by limiting establishment rights and the types of
authorized banking, Hungary will be helping its own banks to
catch up.
Finally, it is critical to remember that the EC and Hunga-
ry have differing resources, concerns, motives and goals at this
point in each one's development. The EC is interested in main-
taining its international competition with world economic lead-
ers, and in using its comparative advantages to gain larger
portions of current markets. In contrast, Hungary desires to
create new stable trading relationships, while infusing its
economy with efficiency in order to finance its structural re-
form. In terms of both economic and banking development,
Hungary is at least twenty years behind the Western world,
and it most likely needs this intermediate banking regulatory
scheme to move conservatively to the next step of full modern
banking regulation.
286. Id.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 155-57 (discussing the somewhat dis-
mal future for banks in EC states which are unprepared for the liberal provisions
of the Second Banking Directive).
288. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although Hungary's stated goals are to encourage foreign
investment and to meet the necessary standards to become a
full EC member quickly, the new banking-law leaves many
barriers to foreign investment in the banking industry, and
falls short of EC standards. Hungary retains discriminatory
provisions in the establishment clause of the 1991 Banking
Law, which makes it more difficult and less desirable to invest
in the Hungarian banking industry. Secondly, a bank which
establishes itself in Hungary, even if it has liberal regulations
at home, is severely limited by being subjected to Hungarian
regulations, particularly in the area of authorized activities.
Thirdly, although the new law meets international standards
for minimum capitalization and solvency, the fact that Hunga-
ry does not offer at least national treatment for foreign banks
remains an almost insurmountable barrier for foreigners look-
ing to invest in the Hungarian financial services market. Addi-
tionally, the fact that the new law limits the percentage of
stock which any particular owner can buy severely discourages
foreign investors who may seek to purchase majority stakes in
the Hungarian banks, but are precluded from doing so by the
new law. Finally, the new law will discourage new investors
from countries permitting universal banking from choosing to
invest in Hungarian banks, because although the new law may
be the only practical conservative approach for Hungary at this
time, Hungary retains the often criticized dual-tiered restric-
tive structure.
In order for Hungary to encourage more investment and
meet the standards under EC's Second Banking Directive, it
will have to update the Banking Law with at least one more
major reform. The reformed banking structure will have to: (1)
allow foreign investors in the financial services market "effec-
tive access" to Hungary's banking market, without any dis-
criminatory treatment regarding ownership percentages; (2)
liberate the scope of activities in which banking institutions
may participate in Hungary, to enable Hungarian banks to
compete with the universal banking structure of the EC; and
(3) maintain strict rules requiring banks to be profit-seeking,
by forcing Hungarian banks to utilize rational business deci-
sions for credit authorization, thereby making the banks stron-
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ger and better able to compete. If a reformed law can meet
these large-scale goals, Hungary's efforts to enter the global
market in other areas of the economy will be greatly facilitat-
ed, and the Hungarians as a whole will substantially benefit.
Overall, Hungary must be applauded for her efforts to
date. She has come farther than any other former Soviet-bloc
nation, and in the banking industry, has done so in record
time. Furthermore, Hungary has made these tough changes
without help from the Western world and in spite of the
world's suspicious view of former communist nations. Finally,
the new Banking Law must be seen not as an end to Hun-
gary's efforts to enter the global banking market, but merely
as an excellent sign of things to come in the future for Hungar-
ian banks and the overall Hungarian economy.
Tracy E. Jung

